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I. THE CAPACITY PROBLEM
A. Objectives of this Article
This Article has two basic objectives. The first is to trace the treatment
by the Supreme Court of agreements to arbitrate statutory rights in
contract disputes governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). By
"statutory rights" I mean rights created by state or federal regulatory
legislation to protect the interests of one party to the transaction and
others similarly situated. This part of the Article is mainly descriptive.
The second purpose is to evaluate how the Supreme Court has responded
to claims that arbitration is ineffective or inappropriate to deal with
statutory rights. These claims attack the capacity of arbitration to resolve
disputes over rights that are imposed on rather than created by the
contract in which the arbitration clause is contained.
My conclusions are that: (1) where the statutory rights are created
by Congress, the Court's unitary, pro-arbitration enforcement of a federal
contract to arbitrate leaves no room for doubt in an area replete with
uncertainty about the capacity of arbitration to achieve its primary
objectives in the regulated transaction; (2) where the statutory rights
are created by state legislatures, the Court's conclusion that the FAA
displaces state law which selectively limits the arbitration of statutory
rights is an unwarranted impairment of the police powers; (3) the current
standards for the judicial review of arbitration awards which decide
statutory rights created by either Congress or the states provide an
inadequate corrective when capacity defects actually materialize in the
arbitral process; and (4) selected reforms are required. At a minimum,
the courts should have clear authority, when statutory claims are in-
volved, to vacate or modify an arbitrator's award where arbitral pro-
cedures denied an adequate hearing or where the arbitrator made a
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error of law. At the maximum, the displacement effect of the FAA on
state regulation of arbitration where statutory rights are involved should
be sharply limited.'
These, reforms, among others, are necessary to neutralize a developing
case "against arbitration" and to encourage the development of different
forms of arbitration to fit the complexity and importance of the particular
dispute. In short, there are too many problems for the unitary and
preemptive concept of arbitration developed by the Supreme Court
under the FAA.
B. Arbitration: The Classic Model
Let us start with the basics. Arbitration is a form of Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR). Unlike other methods of ADR, however,
arbitration is a private adjudicatory process invoked as an alternative
to filing a law suit. The classic model of arbitration can be reduced to
three essential elements. First, arbitration depends upon consent. The
parties must agree, either before or after the dispute arises, to arbitrate
the dispute. In most cases, that agreement will be evidenced by mutual
assent to a commercial or consumer contract which contains a written
arbitration term.
Second, arbitration is a less formal adjudicatory process that has
assumed advantages over litigation in courts or other forms of ADR.2
The parties expect that an unbiased and competent private arbitrator
will conduct a relatively expeditious, informal, inexpensive, and private
hearing and decide the merits of the dispute fairly between them.3
Third, the arbitrator is empowered by the agreement and applicable
arbitration rules to make a final decision on the merits of the dispute,
1. One such limitation is where the parties have agreed to arbitrate under the law of
a state imposing conditions on the contract right to arbitrate not found under federal law.
In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior
University, 109 S.Ct. 1248 (1989), the Supreme Court held, in a 6-2 decision, that such
a choice of law provision was enforceable even though the agreement was otherwise
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.
2. See generally Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice:
Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 893.
3. An empirical question, for which there is no clear answer, is whether arbitration
is effective in achieving justice between the parties at an advantage in time and expense
over litigation. The relevant studies are analyzed in Stipanowich, Rethinking American
Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425 (1988). The dominant themes, as developed from interviews
with the users of arbitration (mostly attorneys), were summarized as follows: "On the
positive side, these include the relative speed and efficiency of arbitration, particularly
in smaller cases, and arbitrator expertise. Prominent concerns include attorney-caused
delays, inadequate arbitrator selection methods and consequent variations in arbitrator
quality, the absence of written opinions accompanying arbitral awards, and high admin-
istrative costs." Id. at 472. Professor Stipanowich concludes that "efforts to determine
how effectively arbitration works and what improvements might be made to the system
have been hampered by the relative lack of meaningful empirical data." Id. at 432.
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i.e., to decide both questions of fact and of law and to provide appropriate
remedies.4
Unlike the judicial process, there is no review of the merits of this
primary decision by the arbitrator. In the absence of fraud, bias, or
process defects, the court is empowered to confirm and enforce the
award as if it were a final judgment. There are, of course, incentives
for negotiated settlement within the arbitral process and the arbitrator's
decision will frequently contain an element of compromise. Nevertheless,
in whatever contexts arbitration is invoked, the parties participate in
the decisional process by presenting evidence and reasoned arguments
to an arbitrator whose final decision should be responsive to the dispute
as presented.5 As a practical matter, finality is achieved when both
parties acquiesce in the arbitrator's decision with or without seeking
limited judicial review.6
C. Characteristics of Arbitration
Although an objective of arbitration is to achieve justice between
the parties through less formal adjudication, the quality of justice may
be different (if not less) than that achieved in civil litigation. As one
court warned, arbitration is "not the most perfect alternative to adju-
dication" in the courts. It is "an inferior system of justice, structured
without due process, rules of evidence, accountability of judgment or
rules of law." In short, "parties should be aware that they get what
4. Compare Note, Private Judging: An Effective and Efficient Alternative to the
Traditional Court System, 21 VAL. U.L. REv. 681 (1987) (private judging as a statutory
process whereby parties refer a dispute to a neutral third party whose decision has the
effect of a traditional court judgment).
5. See Fuller, The Forms and Limitations of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. Rav. 353,
363-64 (1979). Like other forms of ADR, arbitration can elevate the prominence of the
parties and deemphasize the role of the attorney in the hearing. See Brunet, Questioning
the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1, 12 (1987).
6. Arbitration law and institutional practice will influence the behavior of the parties.
If, for example, trade practice favors arbitration, participants may be more willing to
arbitrate and less inclined to seek relief from the arbitration agreement or the award in
court. Similarly, if arbitration law favors the arbitration agreement and finality of the
award, a disappointed party will have less incentive to sue. See Bonn, The Predictability
of Non-Legalistic Adjudication in the Textile Industry, 27 ARI. J. 29 (1972). It is an
open question how much influence these factors have on decisions to arbitrate or to seek
relief in court and whether the pressure actually exerted is healthy. Compare Kronstein,
Arbitration is Power, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 661 (1963), who railed against the potential
for abuse by private arbitration panels serving private interest without judicial review.
One can predict that if one party gets some but not all of the claim in arbitration, that
gain can be balanced against the estimated cost and probable success of a judicial appeal.
See Bush, supra note 2. Unless agreed settlements of specified claims are against public
policy, an informed calculus made in favor of acquiescence should be no cause for concern.
For a brief discussion of adjudication outside of courts, see Galanter, Reading the Landscape
of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 34-36 (1984).
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they bargain for and that arbitration is far different from adjudication."7
What do the parties get when they bargain for arbitration? The
characteristics of the classic model of arbitration, along with its potential
strengths and limitations, emerge when it is contrasted with the judicial
process." For emphasis, the differences will be stated in the extreme.
1. Control Over Scope, Content and Arbitrator Selection. As a
voluntary9 dispute resolution technique, one party can avoid arbitration
by refusing to agree to arbitrate an existing or future dispute. But if
a decision to arbitrate is made, the parties have an opportunity to define
the scope and content of the process as well as to control its procedures
in the agreement. The same cannot be said for civil litigation. Similarly,
the arbitrator is selected by or through procedures agreed to by the
parties while the judge is imposed upon them by law and local allocation
practices. 0
2. Less Formality and Complexity. Arbitration procedures and fact
finding processes are not clearly defined or required by arbitration
statutes. They depend upon the agreement, relevant arbitration practice
or institutional procedures, such as the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) Arbitration Rules, and are usually less formal than those in
court. The arbitrator has less authority than a judge to order discovery
or to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of evidence.
The parties have less power to engage in pretrial discovery. The parties,
however, may define by agreement the procedures and the powers of
and even the substantive law and remedies to be applied by the arbitrator.
In the absence of such agreement, arbitration procedures may be attended
with a great deal of uncertainty."
3. Duration of Proceedings. In arbitration, the arbitrator and the
parties control the timing, duration, and complexity of the hearings. In
judicial proceedings, these matters may be beyond the parties' control.
The potential for savings in time and cost, therefore, differs. In short,
arbitration is expected (and assumed) to be quicker, less formal and
less expensive than litigation in court.
7. Stroh Container Co. v. Delhi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 751, n.12 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
8. For a useful, comparative chart, see Green, A Comprehensive Approach to the
Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution, 34 J. LEGAL ED. 245, 257-58 (1984).
9. So-called mandatory arbitration, such as court-annexed arbitration, is not truly
arbitration at all. After a lawsuit is filed, the parties are compelled to submit the disputes
to an arbitrator whose decision is not final. See, e.g., Walker, Court-Ordered Arbitration
Comes to North Carolina and the Nation, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 901 (1986); Note,
On Behalf of Mandatory Arbitration, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1039 (1984).
10. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1982), where the court is authorized
to designate an arbitrator if the parties have failed to provide a method of selection or
the provided method fails.
11. See Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 443-45; Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REV. 623, 629-35 (1988).
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4. Arbitrator Expertise. In arbitration, the arbitrator is expected to
be an expert in or familiar with the context within which the dispute
arose while a judge will, normally, have no special expertise. 12 Fur-
thermore, an arbitrator is not required to produce a written opinion
with reasons for the decision. Presumably, this reduces the risk of
disagreement over reasons by parties otherwise satisfied with the result.
In court, a reasoned opinion by a judge is required.
5. Confidentiality. Arbitration is touted as a private process where
confidence is normally maintained while the opposite is true in court.
6. Justice Between the Parties. A primary objective in arbitration is
to achieve a just result between the parties.' 3 But arbitration seeks
particularized justice rather than to foster substantive consistency and
predictable results for the future. Courts, on the other hand, are con-
cerned both about just results and announced precedent and the effect
of the decision on third persons who are not parties to the litigation.
Furthermore, in arbitration, a compromise decision is possible while
judicial decisions tend to be either win all or lose all. According to
some observers: "The arbitration process frequently resembles three-
party negotiation or mediation, with many arbitrators consciously or
unconsciously identifying outside parameters of possible settlement and
endeavoring to reach a decision that will at least be minimally acceptable
to both parties."''
4
In sum, arbitration is a form of consensual, relatively informal,
personalized adjudication where the primary objective is to obtain less
expensive justice between the parties.' 5 The challenge is to obtain
particularized justice in an extra-legal adjudicatory process which has
potential strengths and weakness when compared to civil litigation.'
6
12. Concerns regarding arbitrator selection and competence are discussed by Stipa-
nowich, supra note 3, at 447-53.
13. Unlike other forms of ADR, with their emphasis upon settlement, an objective of
arbitration, with all of its limitations, is "not simply to resolve a dispute but to resolve
it justly." Fiss, Second-Class Justice, Conn. L. Tribune, Mar. 17, 1986, at 1, 10.
14. E. JOHNSON, V. KANTOR & E. SCHWARTZ, OUTSIDE THE COURTS; A SURVEY OF
DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES IN CIVIL CASES 55 (1977). See Shell, supra note 11, at 633-
35. But see F. KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION 5, 26, 85 (1948), who insisted that a
final, just decision is impaired if the arbitrator either participates in settlement negotiations
between the parties or makes a compromise decision.
15. See Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 595, 645 P.2d 1192, 1198, 183
Cal. Rptr. 360, 366 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 1 (1983), where the
court said: "Arbitration is generally considered to be a mutually advantageous process,
providing for resolution of disputes in a presumptively less costly, more expeditious, and
more private manner by an impartial person or persons typically selected by the parties
themselves."
16. Professor Brunet identifies six functions common to ADR that can be found in
some degree in arbitration: (1) speedy and low cost dispute processing; (2) de-emphasis
of judicial involvement; (3) emphasis on party or client direction and de-emphasis on
attorney representation; (4) minimal and informal adjudicative procedures; (5) private
proceedings; and, (6) creative norm production and avoidance of substantive law. Brunet,
supra note 5, at 10-15.
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These are the basics. How well does the classic model of arbitration
with its differences from litigation achieve its objectives in the regulated
transaction?17
D. Arbitral Capacity in the Regulated Transaction
1. Arbitration and the "Case Against Settlement." There are recurring
doubts about the capacity of arbitration to achieve satisfactory results
in all cases, even though the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute.18
These are selective concerns. They focus upon the limitations of arbi-
tration as an effective adjudicatory process in complex cases 9 or upon
the inappropriateness of privlate adjudication to resolve issues of public
importance.20 These questions of effectiveness and appropriateness have
been frequently raised where the parties have contested rights created
by regulatory legislation and have agreed to arbitrate disputes that
17. Professor Shell, in analyzing the effect of res judicata and collateral estoppel in
commercial arbitration, has concluded that apart from similarities in form, "the analogy
between arbitration and court adjudication breaks down .... " Apart from the fact that
arbitration is a private rather than a public institution with "categorically different"
factfinding models, "arbitration awards are frequently unexplained and difficult to in-
terpret." As a result, "[t]his deliberate lack of reasoned explanation for arbitrator's decisions
raises serious questions of accountability." Shell, supra note 11, at 658-60.
18. The probability that arbitration will achieve its basic objectives is reduced when
the following facts are present:
(1) At the time of contracting, one party had relatively little understanding of
the nature and objectives of arbitration or both parties, because of inadequate
planning, failed to foresee the nature and complexity of the dispute which actually
arose. This would increase the degree of post-dispute regret over the earlier decision
to arbitrate.
(2) The dispute arose from a relationship between the parties which has ruptured,
thus reducing the incentive to accept the award and preserve the relationship.
(3) The nature and complexity of the dispute tests the competence of the
arbitrator to achieve justice between the parties or the capacity of the available
procedures to build an adequate record and to accomplish the intended objectives
of speed, informality and lower costs.
(4) The dispute arose in a context where institutional arbitration devices, if
any, are ineffective or apparently biased in favor of one party or hostile, in general,
toward arbitration.
(5) Important external or "public" interests are involved which suggest that
the dispute should be adjudicated by a court. These might include statutory rights
created for the protection of one party or a class of persons similarly situated or
the "public" interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws. See Shell, supra
note 11, at 628-35, 657-63. See also Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute
Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916 (1984); Furnish, Arbitration and Long-Term Com-
mercial Agreements, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 123 (Supp. 1978); Carlston, Theory of
the Arbitration Process, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 631 (1952).
19. E.g., Stipanowich, supra note 3.
20. It is claimed that arbitration is ill-suited to resolve disputes over legal rules that
are "designed to protect the interests of third parties or the public at large, and thus
foster ends other than fairly resolving the dispute between the parties." Sterk, Enforceability
of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO
L. REV. 481, 492-93 (1981). See also Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the
Public Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239 (1987).
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"relate to" as well as rights "arising out of" the underlying contract in
which the arbitration clause is contained. 2'
Doubts about arbitral capacity parallel doubts about a primary ob-
jective of the ADR movement, namely agreed settlement. ADR seeks
to increase the incidence of negotiated settlement and decrease the need
for decisions on the merits by a court. The objectives and methods of
ADR operate whether or not a lawsuit has been filed, although consid-
erable attention has been lavished on post-suit ADR.22
However the process is orchestrated, the primary objective in ADR
is to achieve peace23 through an agreed settlement of the dispute. The
difficult question is when the achievement of peace through agreement
is at an unacceptable cost to the demands of justice through civil
litigation. 24
Some critics are not pleased about the quality of justice dispensed
through ADR. In a far ranging article, 25 Professor Edward Brunet has
argued that the procedures of ADR fail to achieve consistent "outcome
21. See Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to the
Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1059 (1987). Morgan draws a Kantian
distinction between the arbitration of rights created by the underlying contract and those
created by the collective processes of the state.
22. See generally Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution An Overview,
37 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1985).
23. See H. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CoNTRAcT 21 (1961), who suggests
that "peace," whether resolving an existing controversy or promoting harmony in the
future, is one of four "uses of contract-in-fact."
24. In a well known article, Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984),
Professor Owen Fiss argued that "settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass
society and should be neither encouraged nor praised" and identified four factors that
contributed to a case "against settlement": first, power imbalances between the parties
affect the bargaining process and contribute to an unfair distribution of resources; second,
in complex relationships, it will be difficult to determine who has authority to bind others
by consent; third, after the agreed settlement, there is no continuing judicial involvement
to insure that the agreement is performed; and fourth, peace is achieved at some cost tojustice, in that a primary task of civil adjudication is to "explicate and give force to the
values embodied in authoritative texts, such as the constitutions and statutes (and) to
interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them." Id. at 1085.
Professor Fiss's "case," which views litigation through a public law lens, has not been
received with enthusiasm in the camps of ADR. See, e.g., Kaufman, Must Every Appeal
Run the Gamut?-The Civil Appeals Management Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 755, 764 (1986),
who concludes: "I have long suspected the best justice is done when the parties voluntarily
abandon litigation in favor of a solution that does not leave one party scarred and the
other exalted." See also Symposium on Litigation Management, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 305
(1987); Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory
Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485 (1985). His case "against" settlement is
undifferentiated and seemingly slights the apparent advantages of negotiated settlement
of many disputes, either before or after litigation is commenced. See generally Bush,
supra note 2. Compare Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
25. Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L.
REv. 1 (1987). The article contains, among other things, a comprehensive citation and
discussion of the relevant ADR literature, including a limited discussion of arbitration.
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accuracy" and that the outcomes of ADR do not give proper deference
to "substantive legal norms.126 Rather, ADR is an "almost entirely
procedural concept" designed to "terminate disputes informally and
silently.""27 According to Brunet, ADR, to achieve quality justice, must
have procedures that "do not ignore substantive law and that facilitate
the crucial guidance function of positive law."'28
These concerns about adequate fact finding procedures, the de-em-
phasis of substantive law, and the absence of judicial involvement in
the merits in ADR parallel questions about the effectiveness and the
appropriateness of arbitration to decide statutory rights. They recall, in
general, Professor Kronstein's warning, given some forty-five years ago,
about the potential abuse of private power exercised through commercial
arbitration as an "institution of private government. ' 29 More particularly,
they question the capacity of arbitration, an adjudicatory method of
dispute settlement, to consistently achieve just results between the parties
and to protect the interests of third parties, in disputes over statutory
rights.
2. A Regulatory Example. To illustrate, consider the following hy-
pothetical example. Suppose that a state legislature or Congress, after
a careful study, enacted legislation to regulate the contractual relation-
ship between franchisers and franchisees. In addition to limiting the
power of the franchiser to terminate the franchise, the statute provided
an expansive definition of fraud by the franchiser and created a private
right of action with special remedies for the franchisee. The franchisee
could recover compensatory damages and, in appropriate cases, punitive
damages and attorney's fees. The legislation also stated that agreements
by the parties purporting to "contract out" of the duties imposed and
rights created by the statute were "void."
Under the model so far, franchisees alone or as a class are empowered
to enforce the statutory rights in court to protect their own interest and
to act as a private attorney general. It is conceivable that the legislation
might also proscribe certain conduct by the franchiser as a crime or
establish an administrative agency with power to enjoin or to exact civil
penalties for violations. Let us suppose, however, that the legislature
left the enforcement of the legislation to the private parties for whom
the statutory rights were created, the franchisees.
A second set of regulatory options involves arbitration. In an extreme
form, the legislature could clearly prohibit the arbitration of rights
26. Id. at 8-9.
27. Id. at 14.
28. Id. at 55.
29. Kronstein, Business Arbitration-An Instrument of Private Government, 54 YALE
L.J. 36 (1944). This theme was reiterated and embellished in a subsequent article. Kronstein,
supra note 6.
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created by the statute. All statutory rights must be adjudicated in court
because arbitration is deemed to be inappropriate.30 Or, the legislature
or Congress could enact a special set of arbitration procedures for the
conduct of arbitration hearings or standards for the judicial review of
awards. For example, the arbitrator might be empowered to hold a more
formal hearing on the legal issues involved and be required, in making
a final award, to state findings of all relevant material facts and make
applicable determinations of law. Similarly, the court might be given
broader power to review the merits of the award.' Finally, the legislature
could require the franchiser to provide more information and choice
about arbitration. Thus, a franchiser might be required to clearly inform
the prospective franchisee that an arbitration clause was included in
the franchise agreement and give the franchisee a choice to "take it or
not" without losing the opportunity to contract. If made, this statutory
regulation of arbitration would be a direct response to doubts about
arbitral capacity in the adjudication of franchise disputes.
Suppose, as is likely, that the regulatory legislation says nothing about
arbitration. Assume further that there is no specialized, stable context
within which the arbitration of franchise disputes regularly occurs. There
is no franchise trade association to develop sound arbitration procedures,
furnish reliable administrative support and be the "keeper" of arbitration
practice. In this setting, the parties, therefore, must depend upon the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) for rules of procedures and
administrative support rather than a franchising trade association.32
Undoubtedly, they will hgree to some variation of the "broad" form
arbitration clause recommended by the AAA, under which they are
obligated to arbitrate "all disputes arising under or related to the
contract, or the breach thereof."
3. Questions for Consideration. This, then, is a hypothetical example
of a regulated transaction, franchising, where arbitration is a common
method of dispute resolution.33 Other possible contexts for regulation
30. As an English scholar put it: "(I)t is in the highest interest of the State, that it
is a matter of public policy of great import to maintain the principle of judicial review
of arbitration, not only to develop the law, but also to ensure the administration of justice
and thus avoid the risk of arbitrariness." Mann, Private Arbitration and Public Policy,
4 Civ. JusT. Q. 257, 267 (1985).
31. See, e.g., New Jersey Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:23A (West 1987); Comment, The New Jersey Alternative Procedure for
Dispute Resolution Act: Vanguard of a "Better Way"?, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1723 (1988).
32. See Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 849 (1961).
Mentschikoff distinguishes arbitrations administered by the AAA from those arising within
a particular trade association or exchange. Compare Getman, Labor Arbitration and
Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916 (1979), who identifies the factors contributing to
the effectiveness of arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.
33. See generally Daughtrey, Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses Against Deceived
Franchisees, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 391 (1987); Rudnick, Arbitration Clauses in Franchise
Agreements, 28 Bus. LAw. 613 (1973). See also Brown, Current Panorama of Private
Litigation Rights in Franchising, 18 NEw ENG. L. REV. 273 (1982).
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include insurance contracts, contracts for the sale of automobiles and
other settings, such as the securities industry, where individuals contract
with organizations and statutory rights are involved. In .the absence of
explicit legislative regulation of arbitration, the following questions about
the capacity of arbitration in such settings are frequently raised.
First, if the arbitration clause was drafted by the franchiser and
offered to the franchisee on a "take it or leave it" basis, should the
franchisee be compelled to arbitrate? To what extent is the standard
form agreement an unconscionable "contract adhesion"?34
Second, should a "broad" arbitration clause be interpreted without
more to include the arbitration of statutory rights-rights that are created
by statute for the protection of the franchisee and the public rather
than arising from the underlying contract of the parties?35
Third, are normal arbitration procedures capable of responding to
the challenge of providing a fair hearing to the parties in complex cases
where statutory rights are involved?36
Fourth, do arbitrators have the competence to interpret and apply
the law and to make awards which adequately protect the statutory
rights of the protected parties?37
Fifth, can an arbitration award (a) protect the interests of third
parties, i.e., a class of franchisees similarly situated, who are affected
by the franchiser's conduct but are not parties to the arbitration agree-
ment and cannot be compelled to participate and (b) can arbitration
awards vindicate and adequately enforce the public interests which are
at stake in the private adjudication of statutory rights, particularly where
the arbitrator is not required to prepare or to publicize an opinion
34. The judicial answer is rarely, if ever. Assuming that one party is not unfairly
surprised by the inclusion of an arbitration clause, the choice to "take it or leave" it is
tempered by the fact that the other party is also bound to arbitrate the dispute. Unless
the contemplated arbitration procedures are inadequate or the arbitrator is biased-
conditions difficult to establish in advance of arbitration-the courts have been unwilling
to decide that the party seeking to avoid arbitration was a victim of "oppression." See,
e.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604
(1981). See also Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir.
1984) (party seeking to avoid agreement to arbitrate submitted no evidence that clause
was commercially unreasonable or that he lacked a reasonable opportunity to understand
it); Di Fiore, Problems in Alternate Dispute Resolution: Arbitration Agreements as
Contracts of Adhesion in Consumer Securities Disputds, 93 CoM. L.J. 259 (1988). See
also infra text accompanying notes 72-84.
35. The answer of the Supreme Court is an emphatic yes. See infra text accompanying
note 142.
36. Regardless of the truth, the answer is assumed by the Supreme Court to be yes
when the enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate is at issue. See infra text accom-
panying notes 126-57.
37. Regardless of the truth, the answer is assumed by the Supreme Court to be yes
where the enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate is at issue. See infra text accompanying
notes 126-57.
166
[Vol. 4:2 1989]
ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY RIGHTS
which, in any event, would have no precedential effect?38 We will devote
the balance of this Article to providing answers to these questions.
II. ARBITRATION LAW UNDER THE FAA: SCOPE AND EFFECT
A. The Role of Arbitration Law
As a matter of arbitration practice, the empirical question is whether
arbitration has the capacity, measured in terms of effectiveness and
appropriateness, to resolve claims involving statutory rights. Although
there are no satisfactory answers to this question, doubts persist.3 9 As
a matter of arbitration law, however, the questions are limited to whether
a court should enforce the alleged agreement to arbitrate or, if an award
has been made, confirm the award and enter a judgment. A critical
inquiry is the degree to which doubts about the capacity of arbitration
to decide statutory rights are relevant to the legal questions posed.
Arbitration law is typically invoked by one of the parties at two
points: (1) at the threshold, where the question is whether the alleged
agreement to arbitrate should be enforced; or (2) after the arbitration,
where the question is whether the final award made by the arbitrator
should be confirmed and enforced by the entry of a judgment or otherwise
be given preclusive effect. Under modern arbitration legislation, at
neither point is the court permitted to examine the merits of the dispute.
Rather, the questions are whether the dispute was "arbitrable" or whether
the arbitrator's final award should be vacated or modified on the basis
of limited statutory grounds.40 In general, doubts about arbitral capacity
must be raised at these two points. 4'
Initially, the question which arbitration law is applicable may be
raised. The choices include state arbitration statutes, such as the Uniform
38. Regardless of the truth, the answer to these questions of public policy is assumed
by the Supreme Court to be yes when the enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate
is at issue, unless Congress has clearly spoken to the contrary. A clear answer by the
states, however, is irrelevant in cases to which the FAA applies. See infra text accompanying
note 60-84.
39. See, e.g., Stipanowich, supra note 3.
40. See Note, The Scope of Modern Arbitral Awards, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1113 (1988).
41. The federal courts have been reluctant to hear appeals from the decisions of
arbitrators made after appointment but before final award. See Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz,
750 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 1984) (no authority to review propriety of arbitrator's resignation
before award). But see Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arb. Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 251
(9th Cir. 1979), where the court reviewed a procedural decision of the arbitrator to
"prevent manifest injustice." Some state courts have held that they have inherent power,
upon request, to disqualify an arbitrator for evident partiality before an award is made.
See, e.g., Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 11 N.Y.2d 128,
182 N.E.2d 85 (1962).
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Arbitration Act,42 the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act 43 or various arbitration schemes developed to
resolve disputes arising within federal administrative programs. 44 As-
suming that the proper legislation is applied, the legal questions presented
remain constant even though the nature of the underlying dispute or
the relevant context may vary.
B. Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925.4 5 A primary purpose was to
insure the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate future disputes46
42. Uniform Arbitration Act, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1985 & Supp. 1987). For a current listing
of state arbitration statutes, see M. DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, App.
1 (Rev. Ed. 1984).
43. Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d)
(1976), provides that "final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared
to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application
or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement." Under the LMRA, labor
arbitration law has been developed by the courts as a matter of federal common law.
Although sometimes used by analogy, Congress probably intended to exclude collective
bargaining agreements from the scope of the FAA. See Ray, Court Review of Labor
Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 32 VILL. L. REv. 57 (1987).
44. A notable example is the arbitration of disputes between private parties over the
use of proprietary data under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), 61 Stat. 125, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982). If the parties are unable to
resolve the dispute by agreement, FIFRA requires final arbitration under specially de-
veloped rules and procedures. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982) and 29 C.F.R. Ch.
XII, Part 1440. The Supreme Court has held that the FIFRA arbitration system was
within the power of Congress under Article I of the Constitution and was not an improper
intrusion on the judicial power of the United States under Article III. Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); see also Note, FIFRA Data-Cost
Arbitration and the Judicial Power: Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.,
13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 609 (1986). See generally Administrative Conference of the United
States, Sourcebook: Federal Agency Use of Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution
(1987).
45. The FAA, originally called the United States Arbitration Act, was enacted on
February 12, 1925. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)). Important sources of legislative history are H.R.
Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) and S. Rep. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
See also Note, The United States Arbitration Act and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153
(1925) (tracing bill from origination in the ABA's Committee on Commerce, Trade and
Commercial Law to enactment); Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law,
12 VA. L. REV. 265 (1926).
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the
New York Convention) was ratified by the United States in 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S.
No. 6997 (1970), and is codified in 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982).
46. In effect, the FAA rejected the common law hostility to the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate future disputes, reflected in the "ouster of jurisdiction" doctrine.
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). As Judge Hough put it in 1915: "The
courts will scarcely permit any other body of men to even partially perform judicial work,
and will never permit the absorption of all business growing out of disputes over a contract
by any body of arbitrators, unless compelled to such action by statute." United States
Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1010-11 (S.D.N.Y.
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and, thus, to put contracts to arbitrate on the same footing as other
contracts.47 This was done in FAA section 2 by providing that a "written
provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. '48
To implement this federal contract right to arbitrate, the federal courts
were granted power to compel arbitration when the dispute was arbitrable49
and to stay litigation previously commenced until the arbitration was
concluded. 50
Regardless of subsequent interpretations by the courts, contemporary
commentators concluded that the newly enacted FAA sought to achieve
rather limited purposes: "The primary purpose of the statute is to make
enforceable in the federal courts such agreements for arbitration, and
for this purpose Congress rests solely upon its power to prescribe the
jurisdiction and duties of the federal courts."5' Conceding that Congress,
under the commerce clause, had power to regulate arbitration disputes
in the state court, the conclusion was that Congress did not exercise
that power under the FAA. Rather, Congress established a "procedure"
in the federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements without "in-
fringement upon the rights of each state to decide for itself what contracts
shall or shall not exist under its laws. '5 2 As the next few paragraphs
reveal, this contemporary view on the limited scope of the FAA has
been obliterated by the force of purposive judicial interpretation.
1. Scope of "Transaction Involving Commerce." The first step in
the obliteration involves an expansive view of the transactions to which
the FAA applies. The transactional scope of the FAA is delineated in
two sections. FAA section 2 validates a "written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration"existing or future disputes. FAA section 1
expansively defines "maritime transactions" and "commerce'" 3 but then
1915). The effect of the "ouster" doctrine was that a party who had agreed to arbitrate
a future dispute could withdraw without an effective sanction anytime before the final
award. See Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1928).
47. See S. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
48. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), also validates an "agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal ...."
49. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
50. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
51. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 45, at 278.
52. Id. at 276.
53. Maritime transactions are defined as "charter parties, bills of lading of water
carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels,
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excludes from the FAA "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce."
In interpreting these sections, the lower federal courts, with some
support from the Supreme Court, appear to have read the language
"contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" to mean any
transaction that Congress could have regulated under its commerce
powers, a reading that includes most commercial transactions that relate
in any way to commerce.' In the Fifth Circuit, at least, the "commerce"
requirement may be satisfied by diversity of citizenship alone." At the
same time, the courts have made it clear that arbitration under collective
bargaining agreements subject to the Labor Management Relations Act
is not governed by the FAA.56
This expansive reading of FAA section 2, although not conclusive,
arguably excludes only those contracts between citizens of the same
state where the essentials of the exchange occur within that state. It
includes, however, a wide range of commercial and consumer transactions
which contain written agreements to arbitrate.
2. Application of the FAA in State Courts. Broad though its trans-
actional scope may be, the FAA does not create federal jurisdiction. 7
To litigate in a federal district court, the parties must either have
diversity of citizenship or assert claims arising under some other federal
collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy,
would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction." Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §
1 (1982). Commerce means "commerce among the several States or with foreign nations,
or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any
such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation,
or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation ..
Id.
54. In brief, the Supreme Court, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co,
388 U.S. 395 (1967), rejected the narrow view that "commerce" should be limited to
contracts between merchants for the interstate shipment of goods. Rather, the FAA applied
to a consulting agreement which was "inextricably tied to . . .interstate transfer and to
the continuing operations of an interstate manufacturing and wholesaling business." Id.
at 401. This expansive interpretation coupled with the "liberal" policy favoring arbitration
announced, in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I
(1983), persuaded the Seventh Circuit to announce, in dictum, that Congress "intended
the FAA to apply to all contracts that it constitutionally could regulate." Snyder v. Smith,
736 F.2d 409, 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
55. See Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d
238, (5th Cir. 1986), where the court said: "Citizens of different states engaged in
performance of contractual operations in one of those states are engaged in a contract
involving commerce under the FAA. Such a contract necessitates interstate travel of both
personnel and payments." Id. at 243. Accord Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp.
Auth., 823 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1987) (contacts need not be substantial so long as they
"relate" to commerce).
56. See Ray, supra note 43.
57. See Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration
Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1341-46 (1985), where the authorities are discussed.
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statute, such as the antitrust laws. Thus, the FAA creates "federal
rights and remedies but no federal question jurisdiction.'" 8
This jurisdictional omission initially created confusion on whether the
FAA applied to agreements to arbitrate rights created by state law
which were litigated in either the federal or state courts. Despite initial
doubts, the current answer to that question is yes.59 Moreover, the FAA
displaces state law in the state courts to the extent that state law
provides less support for arbitration than does federal law. This is the
teaching of Southland Corporation v. Keating,' an important decision
whose implications have yet to be fully understood.61
(a) The Southland Case. Southland is the personification of our
franchise hypothetical on the state level. A franchisee class sued a
franchiser in a state court for damages and other relief caused by alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations and performance under franchise contracts.
Some of the fraud rights were created by the California Franchise Act
which, in addition, appeared to void provisions in franchise agreements
purporting to waive access to a judicial forum.62 The franchise agreements
also contained a broad arbitration clause and the FAA applied because
the contracts "evidenced" a transaction in commerce. The parties,
however, were not of diverse citizenship.
The franchiser sought to compel arbitration of all claims. The superior
court granted the motion except for claims arising under the Franchise
Act: The agreement to arbitrate those claims was void. The court of
58. Id. at 1345.
59. The complete answer unfolded in three steps. First, if there was diversity of
citizenship and the FAA did not apply, (Le., the transaction did not "evidence" commerce),
state arbitration law applied in the federal court to the extent that it was "outcome
determinative." Thus, if state legislation, in regulating the franchise contracts, created
statutory rights in the franchisee for fraud by the franchiser and declared that disputes
over that right must be litigated in court, the Federal District Court would be bound.
This is the teaching of Erie and its progeny. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938); see Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Hirshman, supra note
57, at 1309-24.
Second, if there is diversity of citizenship and the FAA did apply because there was
a transaction in "commerce," the FAA applied in its entirety to arbitration disputes in
the federal courts. This means that an agreement to arbitrate which was enforceable
under FAA § 2 would prevail over state legislation limiting the arbitrability of statutory
rights, whether the issue were characterized as "substantive" or "procedural." Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 (1984). The Court said that it was "clear beyond
question that if this suit had been brought as a diversity action in a federal district court,
the arbitration clause would have been enforceable" (footnote omitted). Id.
Third, Southland also held that if there was no diversity of citizenship and the FAA
did apply, the substantive and, perhaps, the remedial provisions of the FAA apply to
litigation in the state courts.
60. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
61. See Hirshman, supra note 57, at 1353-78.
62. The statute, based upon language in the 1933 Securities Act, provided: "Any
condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise
to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is
void." CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 31512 (West 1977).
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appeals reversed and ordered arbitration of all claims. 63 The California
Supreme Court reversed in part and held, among other things, that the
California Franchising Act should be interpreted to void agreements to
arbitrate fraud claims created by that Act and that the statute did not
contravene the FAA." In short, the California legislature had determined
that the statutory rights were not appropriate for arbitration.
Upon direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. 65 The Court, speak-
ing through Chief Justice Burger, held that: (1) the FAA governed the
dispute over the effect of state law, whether litigated in the state courts
or in a federal court under diversity jurisdiction; and (2) section 2 of
the FAA, which "validated" agreements to arbitrate future disputes,
created a substantive federal rule which preempted the California Fran-
chise Act to the extent that it voided agreements to arbitrate statutory
fraud claims created by the Act. This conclusion was rooted in both
the presumed intention of Congress when enacting the FAA and the
power of Congress to regulate commerce: "In creating a substantive
rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to
foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of
arbitration agreements."
According to the Court, the FAA created a "body of federal sub-
stantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement
within the coverage of the Act."6 Bolstered by a "liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements," this body of substantive law was
enforceable in both state and federal courts. Further, in section 2 of
the FAA, Congress "withdrew the power of the states to require a
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties
agreed to resolve by arbitration." The only escape from this preemption,
apart from the agreement of the parties, was if (1) the agreement to
arbitrate was not part of a contract "evidencing" interstate commerce
or (2) the agreement to arbitrate was revocable under the "savings"
clause of FAA section 2, i.e., "upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." 61
63. Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1980).
64. Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1982).
65. The Court held that it had jurisdiction to decide whether the FAA preempted
state law but not to review whether arbitration could be compelled in a class action.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. at 6-9 (1984).
66. Id. at 16 (footnotes omitted).
67. The Court quoted from Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
68. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See Perry v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct.
2520, 2526 (1987), where the Southland decision was affirmed and applied to preempt
a provision of the California Labor Law which stated that wage collection actions may
be maintained without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.
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Justice Stevens, concurring and dissenting, urged a more flexible
approach to the preemption question. He argued that the state policy
"providing special protection for franchisees" could be recognized with-
out impairing a basic purpose of the FAA, which was to make agreements
to arbitrate future disputes "as enforceable as other contracts, but not
more so. "69 Justice Stevens would have used the "savings" clause in
FAA section 2 to examine the substance of the transaction at issue,
the nature of the relationship between the parties, and the purpose of
the state regulatory scheme. Even so, he did not discuss whether, between
the poles of freedom of contract and the defense of public policy,
arbitration had the capacity to deal with the particular issues involved.
Justice Stevens apparently assumed that they were and balanced the
state public policy against the FAA's strong pro-arbitration policy."
Attractive as it may be, Justice Steven's functional approach was
rejected by the Court. Rather, the majority displaced state legislative
limitations upon the arbitration of state created rights where the agree-
ment to arbitrate was governed by FAA section 2. As a result, state
legislative doubts about the capacity of arbitration to deal with statutory
rights, whether created in the regulation of franchising, insurance,7
securities sales or consumer sales, are irrelevant even though the state
otherwise has comprehensive, modern arbitration legislation.
(b) Displacement Effect of Southland. One effect of Southland is
clear.72 The federal contract right to arbitrate will displace state law,
no matter how clearly stated, that requires judicial resolution rather
than arbitration in a particular dispute. Thus, in Perry v. Thomas,73 the
Supreme Court enforced the federal right to arbitrate which was in
"unmistakable conflict with California's [legislative] requirement that
litigants be provided a judicial forum for resolving wage disputes." 74
69. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. at 19 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404, n.12 (1967)).
70. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented. O'Connor could find no
basis for concluding that either the Constitution or the FAA should be interpreted to
preempt state regulation of arbitration, especially where those issues arose in state courts.
Id. at 21-36.
71. See Comment, Insurance Arbitration and the Standard Form Contract After
Southland, 30 S.D.L. REv. 617 (1985).
72. According to Professor Hirshman, the majority in Southland closed off two possible
continuing roles for state law under the FAA:
First, the preemptive effect of the FAA ... is not confined to state law based
on historic, across-the-board hostility to arbitration: it displaces all state law limiting
arbitration regardless of the underlying policy. Second, defenses directed to the
formation of the arbitration agreement are treated ... in the same way as other
grounds for revocation under section 2 [FAA]. Accordingly, state-law restrictions
on contracting for arbitration are no more immune to the impact of the FAA than
restrictions on enforcement of the arbitration agreement after it is made.
Hirshman, supra note 57, at 1350.
73. 107 S. Ct. 2520 (1987).
74. Id. at 2526. Accord Fogarty v. Piper, 781 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1986) (FAA displaces
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In addition, displacement is probable when state legislation imposes
limitations upon the right to arbitrate not found in the FAA. 71 Thus,
state laws that require agreements to arbitrate to be in conspicuous
type or to satisfy higher standards of consent are vulnerable to dis-
placement.76 Further, state judicial decisions which refuse to enforce
federal contracts to arbitrate on grounds not applicable to "any contract"
are highly suspect." Thus, a decision invoking a higher or different
standard of fraud or unconscionability in arbitration than applied in
other contractual disputes would be displaced. 8 On the other hand, state
law which differs from but does not impose a limitation on the right
to arbitrate under the FAA should be enforced.79 As one court put it,
while "inconsistent state law is preempted, not all state law is preempted
upon application of the Act. State law should be preempted only to
limitation on arbitration imposed by state securities regulation); Commerce Park at DFW
Freeport v. Mardian Constr. Co., 729 F.2d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 1984) (FAA displaces
prohibition of arbitration contained in Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Acts).
75. "We see nothing in the Act indicating that the broad principle of enforceability
is subject to any additional limitations under state law." Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 11 (1984).
76. For a recent application, see Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 803,
806-07 (8th Cir. 1986), holding that the FAA preempted a Missouri statute requiring an
arbitration agreement to be in "ten point capital letters." This was so even though the
contract stipulated that Missouri law applied. See also Securities Industry Ass'n v. Connolly,
703 F. Supp. 146 (D. Mass. 1988); Bunge Corp. v. Perryville Feed & Produce, 685
S.W.2d 837 (Mo. 1985); Garmo v. Dean Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 101 Wash. 2d 585, 681
P.2d 253 (1984).
77. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), which provides that the written
agreement to arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
78. In Perry v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520 (1987), the Court, in dictum, stated:
A state law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract
to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with . . . [FAA § 2]. . . . A court may
not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement,
construe that agreement in a manner different from that in which it otherwise
construes nonarbitration agreements under state law. Nor may a court rely on the
uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for state-law holding that
enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect
what we hold today the state legislature cannot.
Id. at 2527, n.9. The dictum that the application of state law must not discriminate
against arbitration has been followed in California. See, e.g., Heily v. Superior Court,
202 Cal. App. 3d 255, 248 Cal. Rptr. 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). See also Brown v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 969, 973-74 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(upholding arbitration agreement contained in an "adhesion" contract under FAA § 2).
79. See New England Energy Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 4-7 (1st
Cir. 1988) (state statute permitting consolidation of two arbitrations does not limit FAA,
which contains no consolidation provisions). Compare Liddington v. Energy Group, Inc.,
192 C.A.3d 1520, 238 Cal. Rptr. 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987), where the court held that
the FAA preempted a provision of the California Code of Civil Procedure which authorized
a court to enjoin arbitration pending the completion of litigation. Since a similar provision
was not found in federal law, the power to enjoin, which applied "solely to arbitration"
in effect limited arbitration in a manner not found in the FAA. Id. at 206.
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the extent necessary to protect the achievement of the aims" of the
federal act in question.'
In summary, the Supreme Court has not construed the FAA to
preempt all state law on arbitration. As one court put it, "at best, the
Supreme Court's decisions support a conclusion that all state laws seeking
to limit the use of the arbitral process are superseded by federal law."8
Further, those cases "concerned only laws that would override the parties'
choice to arbitrate rather than litigate in court, in direct conflict with
the Act's primary purpose of ensuring the enforcement of privately
negotiated arbitration agreements.18 2 This reading, among other things,
persuaded the Supreme Court in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University83 to hold
that if parties otherwise subject to the FAA agreed to arbitrate and
explicitly choose the law of a particular state which imposed limitations
upon arbitration not found in the FAA, that choice of law would be
enforced."
Nevertheless, the post-Southland developments still impose substantial
limitations upon the power to the states to forbid or regulate arbitration
in disputes over statutory rights created by state law.
C. Arbitrability and Separability: The Effect of Prima Paint
1. Arbitrability. Disputes over whether the agreement to arbitrate is
enforceable inevitably involve the concept of arbitrability.85 If the dispute
is arbitrable, the court is empowered to compel arbitration under FAA
section 4 and to issue an order staying any pending litigation under
80. Wasyl, Inc. v. First Boston Corp., 813 F.2d 1579, 1582 (9th Cir. 1987), holding
that a California definition of agreements to arbitrate which included "valuations [and]
appraisals" was not displaced by the FAA. Although the FAA did not define arbitration
so expansively, the California definition "does not conflict in any way with the federal
policy favoring arbitrations agreements, and in fact seems to promote such policy .
Id.
81. New England Energy Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
1988).
82. Id.
83. 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989).
84. The United States Supreme Court affirmed Board of Trustees v. Volt Information
Sciences, 195 Cal. App. 3d 349, 240 Cal. Rptr. 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987), review denied
by California Supreme Court. The California Court of Appeals enforced the agreement
to choose California law and its procedures, even though it invoked law which was arguably
inconsistent with the FAA, i.e., permitted a court to enjoin an arbitration pending litigation.
Otherwise, the "effect would be to force the parties to arbitrate where they agreed not
to arbitrate . . ." and this would be "inimical to the policies underlying state and federal
arbitration law . . ." and "violate basic principles of contract law." Id. at 355, 240 Cal.
Rptr. at 561. The Volt decision seemingly overrules decisions holding that such agreements
are not enforceable. Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 274-
75 (7th Cir. 1982); Huber, Hunt & Nichols v. Architectural Stone Co., 625 F.2d 22, 25
(5th Cir. 1980); Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O-Corp., 467 F.2d 995 (8th Cir. 1972). The
Volt case is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 23240.
85. See generally Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act,
71 IOWA L. Rav. 1137 (1986).
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FAA section 3. If the dispute is not arbitrable, the court will not enforce
the alleged agreement to arbitrate and may enjoin any arbitration that
has been commenced. 6 The arbitrability question is resolved after an
expedited hearing before the court or, in some cases, a jury. 7
Traditionally, a dispute is arbitrable if the parties have agreed in
writing to arbitrate an existing or future dispute8 and the particular
dispute is within the scope of that agreement. 9 Determining the scope
of an agreement to arbitrate is, in essence, a problem of contract
interpretation, and is aided by what the Supreme Court has called a
"liberal" policy favoring arbitration. 9° Thus, doubts in interpretation are
likely to be resolved in favor of arbitration.9'
Arbitrability, however, is subject to the claim that the agreement to
arbitrate was invalid because of defects in the agreement process, such
as fraud, duress, mistake or unconscionability92 or was unenforceable
because arbitration in the particular setting was against public policy.93
If either claim is established, the agreement to arbitrate will not be
enforced.
2. Separability. Who decides that a dispute is not arbitrable, the
court or the arbitrator? In 1967, the Supreme Court in Prima Paint v.
Flood & Conklin,94 recognized the separability of the agreement to
arbitrate from the underlying contract in which it was contained. The
86. The judicial power to enjoin arbitration is thought to be incidental to the power
inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy
of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. See Tai Ping Ins. Co. v. M/
V Warschau, 731 F.2d 1141, 1143-44 (5th Cir. 1984). The decision to enjoin arbitration,
however, is discretionary and turns on the probability that, on the merits, the dispute is
not arbitrable. City of Meridian v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 527 (5th Cir.
1983).
87. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
88. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), provides in part: "[a] written
provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract."
89. See Note, The Consequences of a Broad Arbitration Clause Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 52 B.U.L. REV. 571 (1972).
90. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
91. See, e.g., Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. 27,946 Long Tons of Corn, 830 F.2d 1321, 1328-
29 (5th Cir. 1987).
92. This exception is found in the "savings" clause in Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 2, which states that the written agreement to arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract" (emphasis added).
93. Unless this exception can be squeezed under the "savings" clause, the FAA provides
no specific support for a "public policy" exception to arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
94. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). For the historical antecedents, see Nussbaum, The "Separ-
ability Doctrine" in American and Foreign Arbitration, 17 N.Y.U. L. REV. 609 (1940).
For a contemporary reaction, see Comment, Federal Arbitration Act and Application of
the "Separability Doctrine" in Federal Courts, 1968 DUKE L.J. 588.
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distinction, although both elusive and difficult to justify,95 is important
because it expands the scope of arbitration: Although the court decides
attacks on the validity of the arbitration clause itself, the arbitrator, if
the agreement so provides, decides all attacks on the validity of the
underlying contract. Perforce, the arbitrator also decides all questions
involving the interpretation and application of the underlying contract.
Applying Prima Paint to our franchise hypothetical, the relevance
of the separability doctrine to the capacity problem is clear. Apart from
claims that the dispute is not arbitrable, all other questions of the
enforceability of or liability and remedy arising from or relating to the
underlying franchise agreement are for the arbitrator. Under a broad
agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrator, not the court, decides whether
the franchise agreement was induced for fraud and whether the franchiser
committed fraud in performance and, if so, what remedies should be
imposed.
D. Summary
Several pieces in the gradual federalization of private arbitration are
now in place. The first is a broad interpretation of the "commerce"
requirement in FAA section 2, which greatly expands the scope of the
FAA. The second is the displacement by the Supreme Court of state
law which limits the federal contract to arbitrate created under FAA
section 2. The third is the separation of the merits of the dispute from
questions of arbitrability at the threshold to arbitration, with the ar-
bitrator empowered to decide both the validity of the underlying contract
and the merits of the dispute if the agreement to arbitrate so provides.
When "separability" and "displacement" are combined in disputes over
state created statutory rights, the effect is to foreclose state attempts
to regulate arbitrability and to confer broad, unreviewable power on
the arbitrator to decide the merits.96
There are two pieces left to consider: (1) what limitations are imposed
at the threshold upon the federal contract right to arbitrate statutory
rights created by other federal legislation; and (2) to what extent can
a federal court review a final arbitration award which decided statutory
rights created by either state or federal law under the FAA or otherwise.
95. Some of the difficulties in application are revealed in Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR
Corp., 763 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1985) (opinion by Judge Posner).
96. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Comprehensive Business Services Co., 833 F.2d 1159 (5th
Cir. 1987) (question of illegality of underlying contract for arbitrator, Texas statute voiding
agreement to arbitrate displaced under FAA § 2); Russolillo v. Thomson McKinnon
Securities, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 1042, 1044-46 (D. Conn. 1988) (provisions of Connecticut
legislation that invalidated agreements to arbitrate securities claims displaced by the FAA
and claims of illegality and violations of public policy under that act "not specifically
directed to the arbitration clause itself" are for the arbitrator).
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III. CAPACITY AT THE THRESHOLD: RISE AND FALL OF THE PUBLIC
POLICY DEFENSE
A. Overview
In cases involving federally created statutory rights, to what extent
have capacity problems, either effectiveness or appropriateness, influ-
enced decisions on arbitrability under the FAA? Put differently, to the
extent that the dispute is otherwise arbitrable, when have concerns about
the capacity of arbitration persuaded the Supreme Court to refuse to
enforce the agreement to arbitrate statutory rights?
Whatever the law may have been before 1987, the current answer
is found in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon," where the
Court held that neither the Securities Act of 1934 nor RICO" expressed
an intention by Congress to preclude the arbitration of the statutory
rights created therein. After reviewing the history and policy of FAA
section 2, the Court announced its basic approach to the problem:
The Arbitration Act, standing alone, ... mandates enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate statutory claims. Like any statutory directive, the Ar-
bitration Act's mandate may be overridden by a contrary congressional
command. The burden is on the party opposing arbitration, however, to
show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for
the statutory rights at issue ... If Congress did intend to limit or prohibit
waiver of a judicial forum for a particular claim, such an intent 'will be
deducible from (the statute's) text or legislative history' ... or from an
inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes."
In short, unless Congress has clearly expressed its concern about
arbitral capacity in the legislation that created the statutory rights, the
agreement to arbitrate must be enforced. A court is not permitted to
speculate about either the effectiveness or appropriateness of arbitration
at the threshold. Exactly how did the Court reach this conclusion?
B. The Rise of the Public Policy Defense: Wilko v. Swan and Its
Progeny
1. Wilko v. Swan. In 1953, the Supreme Court, in Wilko v. Swan,"
was asked to decide whether a dispute, clearly arbitrable under the
FAA, should be resolved in court because of congressional intention
expressed in another federal statute, the Securities Act of 1933. A
97. 482 U.S. 220 (1987), reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 31 (1987).
98. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
99. Shearson American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27.
100. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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private investor, asserting a special right of action expressly created by
Congress in the 1933 Securities Act, sued the defendant, a broker, in
a federal district court for fraud in misrepresenting the affairs of a
corporation, which was making an initial offering of stock. The defendant
sought a stay of litigation under FAA section 3, claiming that the
parties had agreed to arbitrate the claim in a broad arbitration agreement
contained in the margin contract. The issue was joined when the plaintiff
contended that arbitration was foreclosed by the terms of the 1933 Act.
Congress had, in the 1933 Act, (a) created a private action for fraud,
(b) provided that the action could be brought in either a federal or
state court, and (c) placed the burden on the broker to prove the absence
of scienter.'0' More importantly, section 14 of the Act provided that
"any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring
any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter
or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." Section
14, however, did not clearly state that "any provision waiving a judicial
forum to enforce rights created by this Act is void." The question was
whether the antiwaiver provision should be so construed.
The district court denied the request for a stay, and held that the
statutory rights must be enforced in court." The Second Circuit reversed
in a two to one decision.' The Supreme Court, in a six to two decision,
reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the ruling of the district
court.'" The Court, speaking through Justice Reed, interpreted the "anti-
waiver" provision of the 1933 Act to void the agreement to arbitrate:
The arbitration clause was a "stipulation" and the statutory right to
select a judicial forum was a "provision" that could not be waived. In
so doing, the Court viewed its task as attempting to reconcile the not
easily reconcilable policies underlying two federal statutes, the FAA
and the 1933 Act.
The Court employed a functional analysis. The FAA provided private
parties with the opportunity to secure, through agreement, the advantages
of arbitration "if the parties are willing to accept less certainty of legally
correct adjustment." The 1933 Act protected the "rights of investors"
and forbade the "waiver of any of those rights." The conclusion: "Re-
cognizing the advantages that prior agreements for arbitration may
provide for the solution of commercial controversies, we decide that the
intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried
101. 15 U.S.C. § 77(d) (1982).
102. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
103. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953). See Note, Enforceability of
Arbitration Agreements in Fraud Actions Under the Securities Act, 62 YALE L.J. 985
(1953).
104. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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out by holding invalid such an agreement for arbitration of issues arising
under the Act."'0 5
It is clear, however, that the result was predicated upon the Court's
assessment of what Congress "must have intended""." and that this
assessment, in turn, was influenced by considerations of both arbitral
effectiveness and appropriateness. The Court emphasized that Congress
intended to protect investors deemed to be at a disadvantage. The Court
stated that a predispute waiver of a judicial forum "surrenders" that
advantage "at a time when he is less able to judge the weight of the
handicap the ... Act places on his adversary."' 7 Furthermore, the Court
stated that the effectiveness of the protection was "lessened in arbitration
compared to judicial proceedings." In support of this conclusion, the
Court made three points: (1) disputes under the 1933 Act were unlike
the usual disputes submitted to arbitration, e.g., disputes over the quality
of goods or the price to be paid, in that the arbitrator must make a
subjective determination of good faith and apply law without judicial
supervision; (2) an arbitration award can be made without stated reasons
or a complete record of proceedings; and (3) under the FAA, a court
has no power to vacate an award for a mere error in the interpretation
of law, although there may be authority to vacate for a "manifest
disregard of law." Even so, there was no practical basis to vacate unless
the error, however stated, is made "clearly to appear." 00
In so holding, the majority rejected Justice Frankfurter's contention
that there was no evidence that either (1) the plaintiff's rights could
not be fully protected in the system of arbitration chosen by the parties
or (2) an unconscionable choice was forced upon the plaintiff at the
time of contracting.'
9
2. The American Safety Doctrine. In the first major showdown, the
public policy defense prevailed at the threshold. Although predicated
upon the presumed intention of Congress, the Court in Wilko emphasized
the problems of choice and procedural adequacy faced by the plaintiff
in agreeing in advance to arbitration. The Court did not clearly conclude
that even if the choice was informed and the procedures were adequate,
the issue was still inappropriate for arbitration. In fact, the Court left
open that possibility that if the parties agreed to arbitration after the
fraud dispute arose, that agreement would be enforced."0 Surprisingly,
105. Id. at 438.
106. Id. at 437.
107. Id. at 435.
108. Id. at 435-36. In concurring, Justice Jackson concluded that the majority should
not have decided that the FAA precludes judicial review of an award for "error in
interpretation of a relevant statute." Id. at 439.
109. Id. at 439-40.
110. Id. at 435. The Court emphasized the danger in agreeing to waive a right to
sue in court "prior to any violation of the Securities Act." Id. Thirty-three years later,
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the Supreme Court's decision in Wilko was virtually ignored by the
commentators and, for the next fifteen years, rested in cold storage.",
In 1968, however, Wilko's spirit was revitalized by the Second Circuit
to achieve a similar result under the federal antitrust laws."' In American
Safety Equipment Co. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.,"' American Safety, a
licensee, sought a declaratory judgment against the licensor, Hickok,
that the license agreement was void ab initio under the Sherman Act
and that no royalties were owed for past performance under the license.
The licensor assigned the royalty claim of some $321,000 to Maquire,
which initiated arbitration under a broad arbitration clause in the license
agreement. The plaintiff then sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity
against Maguire and a preliminary injunction against the arbitration.
Maguire then moved under FAA section 3 to stay the declaratory
judgment action until arbitration was completed. The district court
granted the stay and, apparently, required the parties to proceed to
arbitration on all issues, including the validity of the license agreement."4
After first holding that the order was appealable, the court came to
the crucial question: Was the statutory right created by the antitrust
laws "of a character inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration"?" 5
Invoking the spirit of Wilko v. Swan, the court then held that the
antitrust claims were "inappropriate for arbitration."" 6 The court con-
ceded that a statutory claim could be arbitrated even though a federal
statute created the right and provided the remedy. The question was
whether the "federal statutory protection of a large segment of the
the Court endorsed the conclusion that "Wilko does not apply to the submission to
arbitration of existing disputes .... Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. at 233 (1987) (citing cases).
111. For a rare, contemporary commentary, see Note, Arbitration Under the Securities
Act of 1933, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 101 (1954). A comment, written in 1977, claimed that
most investors were unaware of Wilko and that the securities industry made no effort to
inform them in the standard-form arbitration clause. Comment, Arbitration of Investor-
Broker Disputes, 65 CAL. L. REv. 120 (1977).
112. During 1968, the New York Court of Appeals also held that agreements to
arbitrate private claims arising under state arbitration law were against public policy. In
re Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tamar Prods., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223 (1968).
The cases are analyzed in Comment, Private Arbitration and Public Enforcement: A
Conflict of Policies, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REv. 406 (1969).
113. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
114. To simplify what the court called a "procedural morass," I have ignored the fact
that Hickok, the assignor, was also a party to the litigation and filed various motions.
Id. at 823.
115. Id. at 825. The court avoided the Supreme Court's recent decision in Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), by holding that the
court rather than the arbitrator should decide the validity of the license agreement when
the source of the invalidity was another federal statute. Otherwise, the arbitrator, under
the "separability" doctrine, would have had power to decide the merits of the public
policy defense.
116. Id. at 828.
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public, frequently in an inferior bargaining position," was more important
than the federal policy validating agreements to arbitrate future disputes.
The answer was yes and the reasons responded to three overlapping
concerns about arbitral capacity.
The first involved the presumed intention of Congress. There was no
statutory language or legislative history to guide the court. Nevertheless,
the court concluded that a claim that the underlying contract was invalid
under the federal antitrust laws, whether asserted in a declaratory
judgment or an action for treble damages, was not merely a private
matter. The plaintiff acts as a private attorney general enforcing a
"national interest in a competitive economy." Because of the adverse
competitive impact of antitrust violations and the claim that the license,
at the time of contracting, was an "instrument of illegality," "we do
not believe that Congress intended such claims to be resolved elsewhere
than in the courts.'
7
In bolstering its conclusion, the court next noted that the arbitration
clause was contained in a contract of "adhesion" and concluded that
Congress did not intend that "contracts of adhesion between monopolists
and their customers should determine the forum for trying antitrust
violations." In so doing, the court contrasted a case where the arbitration
clause was fully bargained, the issue was relatively simple, and the
contract was "perfectly proper" when made. The court also noted that
it was dealing with an agreement to arbitrate future disputes rather
than "an agreement to arbitrate made after a controversy has already
arisen. '
Finally, the court raised questions about the effectiveness of the
arbitral process to deal with antitrust claims. The issues in antitrust
litigation are "prone to be complicated, and the evidence extensive and
diverse, far better suited to judicial than to arbitration procedures."" 9
Furthermore, antitrust laws regulate the business community: "Since
commercial arbitrators are frequently men drawn for their business
expertise, it hardly seems proper for them to determine these issues of
great public interest."'20
For these reasons, the court concluded "only that the pervasive public
interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the nature of the
claims that arise in such cases, combine to make the outcome clear.'"''
The district court, therefore, erred in submitting the validity issue to
the arbitrator and the case was remanded to determine, among other
117. Id. at 827.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 827-28.
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things, whether the royalty claim was sufficiently separate from the
validity issue that it could and should be arbitrated.'2
3. Summary. In retrospect, American Safety, decided fifteen years
after Wilko, was the "high water" mark of the public policy defense. "
The principle was restated by Judge Posner in 1983: "Federal Antitrust
issues ... are not arbitrable .. ." in the sense that "an agreement to
arbitrate them would be enforceable .... They are considered to be at
once too difficult to be decided competently by arbitrators-who are
not judges, and often not even lawyers-and too important to be decided
otherwise than by competent tribunals.' 24 In short, both the contract
"right" to and the presumed efficiency advantages of arbitration are
thought to be outweighed by other considerations in the relevant context.'
2
C. 1968-1987: The Decline of the Public Policy Defense
1. International Transactions: The Mitsubishi Motors Case. The de-
cline of a defense to arbitration based upon the public importance of
the statutory rights and judicial doubts about the capacity of arbitration
was first announced in 1974, when the Supreme Court limited the scope
of Wilko to domestic as opposed to international commercial transactions. '
In 1985, the Court reinforced the line between domestic and inter-
national transactions in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth.27 In a long and complex opinion, the Court held that an
American court should enforce an agreement to arbitrate antitrust claims
in Japan "when that agreement arises from an international transaction,"
122. Id. at 827-28. Subsequent decisions, without questioning the public policy decision,
have wrestled with such questions as whether some claims are separate or whether the
antitrust issues "permeate" the dispute and, if there is no permeation, whether arbitration
of the separate issues should occur before or after adjudication in court of validity
questions. Recent decisions show a reluctance to find "permeation" and a preference for
arbitrating first. See, e.g., NPS Communications, Inc. v. Continental Group, Inc., 760
F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1985); University Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Unimarc, Ltd., 699 F.2d
846 (7th Cir. 1983). See generally Lee, Antitrust and Commercial Arbitration: An
Economic Analysis, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1 (1987); Allison, Arbitration Agreements
and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public
Policies, 64 N.C.L. REv. 219 (1986).
123. For contemporary reactions to the decision, see Symposium, Arbitration and
Antitrust, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1069 (1969). The Symposium features an introduction by
Judge Wilfred Feinberg, the author of American Safety, and articles by Robert Pitofsky,
Lee Loevinger, and Gerald Aksen.
124. University Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 850 (7th Cir.
1983).
125. It is assumed, however, that an agreement to arbitrate an antitrust claim made
after the dispute arose would be enforceable. See Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 654 F. Supp.
1487, 1516 n.101 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing cases).
126. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
127. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). See Comment, Enforcing International Commercial Ar-
bitration Agreements-Post-Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
36 AM. U.L. REv. 57, 72-77 (1986).
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even though the effect of the alleged anticompetitive conduct would be
felt in Puerto Rico.12 8 The Court recognized that American Safety had
held that the rights conferred by the antitrust laws were "of a character
inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration," but held that this con-
clusion, to the extent still viable in a domestic context, 29 should not
control in international transactions: "we conclude that concerns of
international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transna-
tional tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international com-
mercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require
that we enforce the parties agreement .... "130
On the surface, both Wilko and American Safety survived this
excursion into international waters. But seeds of doubt were planted
about future applications at home. More particularly, Mitsubishi rejected
all of American Safety's concerns about the effectiveness of arbitration
and the capacity of arbitrators to decide antitrust disputes except the
core, which was the "fundamental importance to American democratic
capitalism of the regime of the antitrust laws" and the "central role"
played by the private cause of action in enforcing this regime.'3,
The Court stated that "potential complexity" alone was insufficient
to avoid arbitration:
[A]daptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration. The
anticipated subject matter of the dispute may be taken into account when
the arbitrators are appointed, and arbitral rules typically provide for the
participation of experts either employed by the parties or appointed by the
tribunal. Moreover, it is often a judgment that streamlined proceedings and
expeditious results will best serve their needs that causes parties to agree
to arbitrate their disputes; It is typically a desire to keep the effort and
expense required to resolve the dispute within manageable bounds that
prompts them mutually to forgo access to judicial remedies. In sum, the
factor of potential complexity alone does not persuade us that an arbitral
tribunal could not properly handle an antitrust matter.32
128. Id. at 624.
129. The Court, in whittling away at the justifications for American Safety, concluded
that the "core of the ... doctrine-the fundamental importance to American democratic
capitalism of the regime of the antitrust laws . . ." did not apply with the same force
in international trade. Id. at 634-35.
130. Id. at 629. The Court's faith in both "international comity" and the efficacy of
international arbitration has been doubted by the commentators. See Comment, supra
note 126, at 85-92. For a more probing, theoretical critique, see Morgan, Contract Theory
and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1059 (1987). Assuming that arbitration is otherwise appropriate for the particular
dispute, Professor Morgan argues for a "theoretical perspective which recognizes an inherent
distinction between those rights which flow naturally from one person's interaction with
another and those which are imposed by the state in furtherance of the collective interest."
Id. at 1082. This distinction, rather than concerns over appropriateness, should lead to a
more satisfactory test to determine when public policy should prevail over private autonomy.
131. Id. at 634-35.
132. Id. at 633-34.
184
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2. Intertwined Issues and the "Liberal" Federal Policy Favoring
Arbitration. Frequently, in commercial disputes, arbitrable issues are
intertwined with issues that are not. This occurs where the parties agree
to arbitrate some but not all of the issues arising from a transaction.
It also occurs where, under a broad arbitration agreement, some of the
issues are not arbitrable because of the public policy defense but the
public policy issues do not permeate the entire dispute. The question
is what comes first, arbitration or litigation? How the court resolves the
issues posed by intertwining will have an impact upon the efficacy of
the public policy defense.
The Supreme Court has approached this question armed with a
"liberal" policy favoring arbitration, first articulated in the 1983 decision
of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.3 3
This "liberal policy" was further refined and applied in Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd.'3 The Court, in Byrd, held that in a dispute
3. Arbitrability of Statutory Rights. It is clear, after Southland,'"
that "arbitrability" is a question of federal law to be decided by the
court rather than the arbitrator. Furthermore, federal law, whether
133. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). In Moses H. Cone, both a state court and a federal district
court had jurisdiction to decide the same question, the arbitrability of a dispute arising
under a construction contract and governed by the FAA. After the dispute arose, Cone
filed an action in a state court to declare that Mercury had no right to arbitrate. Mercury
then filed a diversity action in a federal district court and moved to compel arbitration
under FAA § 4. In order to grant the motion, the district court would have to decide
that the dispute was arbitrable.
The federal district court granted Cone's motion to stay arbitration under the FAA
pending the state court's decision on arbitrability. The Supreme Court, after a direct
appeal, reversed and held that the federal district court should have decided the arbitrability
question and, if the dispute were arbitrable, compelled arbitration under FAA § 4. This
was so even though the state action on the same issue was filed first and still pending
and that no, all of the issues arising from the contract were arbitrable.
In confronting the complexities of the doctrine of abstention, see Note, Federal Court
Stays and Dismissals in Deference to Duplicate State Court Litigation: The Impact of
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction, 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 435 (1985),
the Court conceded that one objective in a decision to abstain in favor of the state action
was to avoid piecemeal litigation. The Court concluded, however, that the costs of bifurcated
and piecemeal litigation were required by the FAA when necessary to give effect to an
arbitration agreement: "the Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law,
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration." Id. at 24-25. Thus was enunciated what the Court called "a congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements ...." Id. at 24.
134. 470 U.S. 213 (1985). See generally Note, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd:
The Unraveling of the Intertwining Doctrine, 62 DEN. L. REV. 789 (1985); Note, The
Enforceability of Predispute Arbitration Agreements Under 10(b) and 10(b)(5) Claims,
43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 923 (1986); Note, Federal and State Securities Claims: Litigation
or Arbitration?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 245 (1986); Note, Enforcing Arbitration of Federal
Securities Law Claims: The Effect of Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 28 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 335 (1986); Note, Investor-Broker Arbitration Agreements: Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 101 (1985).
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where arbitrable securities claims under state law were intertwined with
nonarbitrable claims arising under the 1934 Securities Act,'35 the district
court should first order the arbitration of the pendent state claims, 3'
even though bifurcated proceedings resulted and the risk of collateral
estoppel in the subsequent federal proceeding was created. The Court
recognized the tension between two federal policies behind the FAA,
the enforcement of contracts to arbitrate and the promotion of efficient
and speedy dispute resolution-both could not be achieved on the facts
in Byrd. Which should prevail?
The Court concluded that "passage of the Act was motivated, first
and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which
parties had entered, and we must not overlook this principal objective
when construing the statute, or allow the fortuitous impact of the Act
on efficient dispute resolution to overshadow the underlying motiva-
tion.""' Thus, the Court must "rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate,
even if the result is 'piecemeal' litigation, at least absent a countervailing
policy manifested in another federal statute .... "I"
In sum, the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration has at least
two objectives: (1) to enforce contracts to arbitrate and (2) to promote
arbitration as an efficient system of dispute resolution. These components
are usually complementary. When in conflict, however, the enforcement
policy should prevail. Thus, the rule is to arbitrate those issues which
can be severed even though (1) the nonarbitrable issues are in litigation
and (2) there will be clear costs to efficiency, unless the public policy
defense is determined to permeate the entire dispute.39
3. Arbitrability of Statutory Rights. It is clear, after Southland,"4
135. Since Dean Witter did not raise the question, the Court declined to decide
whether the Wilko doctrine applied to the 1934 Act. The case proceeded on the assumption
that it did. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 215 n.1 (1985). Concurring,
Justice White stressed that the issue was still open and that contrary holdings in the
lower courts "must be viewed with some doubt." Id. at 225.
136. Byrd sued in a federal district court and alleged violations of both the 1934
Securities Act and state law. The district court had both diversity and pendent jurisdiction.
Dean Witter moved to sever the pendent state claims, to compel arbitration of those
claims but to stay arbitration until the federal claims were resolved. The district court
denied Dean Witter's motion in its entirety and, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed insofar as the district court denied the motion to compel
arbitration. In effect, the Court ruled that the state claims were severable from the federal
claims and that the state claims should, under the arbitration agreement, be arbitrated
even though the federal claims were still pending. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,
470 U.S. 213 (1985).
137. Id. at 220 (footnote omitted).
138. Id. at 221.
139. Arbitration experts must master such terms as "separability," (Prima Paint, 388
U.S. at 414, 421) "intertwining," (Byrd, 470 U.S. at 216) and "permeation." For an
example of the latter, see Applied Digital Tech., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 576 F.2d
116 (7th Cir. 1978) (antitrust issues so permeate dispute that district court cannot decide
contract issues without deciding antitrust defense).
140. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). See supra text accompanying
notes 60-71.
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that "arbitrability" is a question of federal law to be decided by the.
court rather than the arbitrator. Furthermore, federal law, whether
created by Congress or selected from state principles, will be infused
by the "liberal" policy favoring arbitration and will be binding in both
the state and federal courts. Finally, after the Byrd141 case, it is clear
that the federal contract right to arbitration will prevail over the claim
that arbitration in the particular case will be, for whatever reason,
inefficient. Put differently, the federal contract right to arbitrate will
be enforced even though the dispute is not otherwise suitable for
arbitration unless Congress, explicitly or implicitly, has declared that
the particular dispute is not arbitrable.
There is one further wrinkle on arbitrability. In determining the scope
of the agreement to arbitrate, private claims created by protective federal
legislation will be treated the same as claims arising under other sources
of law.
In Mitsubishi,42 the Court rejected the argument, made by Soler
and supported by Justice Stevens, that statutory claims should be
presumed to be outside of the scope of an arbitration agreement unless
the parties have explicitly included it. Instead, the Court adopted a
two-step inquiry: first, the district court should determine under normal
principles of interpretation "whether the parties' agreement to arbitrate
reached the statutory issues' 141 and, if so, second, the district court
should determine whether "legal constraints external to the parties'
agreement" foreclose the arbitration of .those claims.'"
The Court refused to "color the lens" through which the scope of
the agreement to arbitrate was determined by reference to the public
policy question. That question, whether Congress has declared that the
statutory rights were not suitable for arbitration, must be answered in
step two.
4. The Last Nail: The McMahon Case.45 In Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon,'46 the Court granted certiorari from the
Second Circuit to consider two public policy defenses to an agreement
between an investor and a broker to arbitrate:
any controversy arising out of or relating to my accounts, to transactions
with you for me or to this agreement or the breach thereof... in accordance
141. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). See supra text
accompanying notes 134-38.
142. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). For
a discussion of Mitsubishi, see supra text accompanying notes 127-32.
143. Id. at 628.
144. Id.
145. For a full discussion of the events in the securities industry up to McMahon,
see Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REv. 393 (1987).
146. 482 U.S. 220 (1987), reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 31 (1987).
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with the rules, then in effect, of the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. or the Boards of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange,
Inc. and/or the American Stock Exchange, Inc., as I may elect.' 7
The first was whether the Wilko doctrine, 48 decided under the 1933
Securities Act, should be extended to the 1934 Act. The Second Circuit
had answered this question in the affirmative. 49 The second was whether
the private rights created by Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganization Act"O could be arbitrated or must be resolved in court. Again,
the Second Circuit had held that RICO rights must be enforced in
court.
It was a bad day for the Second Circuit. In a five to four decision,
the Court refused to extend Wilko to the 1934 Act. In a unanimous
decision, the Court held that RICO claims, otherwise within the scope
of the agreement to arbitrate, must be arbitrated under section 2 of
the FAA. In short, the public policy defense was rejected in both cases.
The conclusion was that the McMahons had failed to "demonstrate that
Congress intended to make an exception to the Arbitration Act for
claims arising under RICO and the Exchange Act, an intention dis-
cernible from the text, history, or purposes of the statute."'' In both
issues, the Court relied heavily upon its reasoning in Mitsubishi Motors,
even though that decision was predicated upon the fact that an inter-
national transaction was involved. 5 2
The Court's discussion of the 1934 Act was preoccupied with issues
of statutory interpretation. The intention of Congress to void agreements
to arbitrate statutory claims was not sufficiently clear.' This uncertainty
was not resolved by resort to doubts about arbitral capacity. Rather,
the Court concluded that Wilko was best understood as a decision hostile
147. Id. at 223.
148. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). For a discussion of Wilko, see supra text
accompanying notes 100-10.
149. McMahon v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 476 U.S. 812 (1986), reh'g denied 108 S. Ct. 31 (1987). Contra Phillips v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 795 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 1986).
150. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp 1985).
151. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27.
152. The Court reiterated its conclusion in Mitsubishi Motors that questions about
arbitral effectiveness raised at the threshold were insufficient alone to avoid arbitration.
Id. at 232.
153. With regard to the Securities Act of 1934, there was no specific language in
the 1934 Act dealing with the arbitrability of private rights created by the statute. There
was language, however, identical to that in the 1933 Act which might be construed to
support an antiwaiver intention. But this language, according to the Court, did not support
the conclusion that Congress intended to invalidate agreements to arbitrate 1934 Act
claims: rather, it made "void" a waiver of compliance with the Act, not the waiver of ajudicial forum to enforce rights created by the act.
Finally, the Court concluded that recent amendments to the securities act did not
support an intention by Congress to incorporate the interpretation of Wilko of statutory
language common to both acts without actually amending the 1934 statute. Id.
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to or suspicious of arbitration rather than a decision that Congress, by
the statutory language common to both the 1933 and 1934 Acts, intended
to void arbitration agreements. The basis for the hostility has been
eclipsed by subsequent decisions of the Court affirming the adequacy
of arbitration in complex cases involving federal statutory rights. Even
if the suspicion was well founded in 1953, oversight by the Securities
Exchange Commission of the arbitral process in the securities industry
has improved-the SEC now has sufficient statutory authority to ensure
that the system of arbitration in investor disputes is adequate to vindicate
statutory rights.'14
With regard to RICO, the Court found nothing in the language of
the RICO statute'55 or the legislative history to support a conclusion
that Congress intended to invalidate agreements to arbitrate private
RICO claims. The question, then, was whether there was any irrecon-
cilable conflict between the FAA and RICO's purposes? The answer
was no. In the Court's opinion, neither the complexity of an issue nor
its overlap with the law of crimes were sufficient to foreclose arbitra-
tion-a complex civil action can be arbitrated even though the underlying
conduct may be prosecuted as a crime.'56
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall
joined, concurred in the decision on the RICO claim but dissented from
the decision on the securities issue. Among other things, Justice Black-
mun doubted whether the majority had given due regard to the congres-
sional policy of investor protection, especially with regard to the capacity
of arbitration to resolve the disputes:
154. The dissent, concluding that Wilko had been "effectively overruled," argued that
the Court's interpretation of Wilko was too narrow; more was involved than a determination
that arbitration was inadequate to protect statutory rights. Rather, Wfilko concluded that
Congress intended that those rights be vindicated in a judicial forum. Furthermore, the
Court's ready acceptance of the protective vigil of the SEC over the arbitral process was
suspicious. There was evidence of systemic bias that might not be adequately protected
against in a judicial review of the award. This simply confirmed a probable intent of
Congress to remove these claims from the arbitral process. Id. at 242-68.
155. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
156. Furthermore, the public interest in RICO litigation did not foreclose arbitration,
because the primary purpose of creating private rights is to compensate for harm caused
rather than to deter crime. The "private attorney general" thesis is even less persuasive
in light of evidence that most private actions under RICO involve "run of the mill"
crimes arising from transactions with legitimate enterprises where the agreement to arbitrate
was made in advance. Finally, the Court was unconcerned about whether the deterrent
effect of the private action could be accomplished in arbitration or whether the rights of
the defendant in the quasi-criminal proceeding could be protected. The Court rejected
the reasoning in cases like Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, 806 F.2d
291 (1st Cir. 1986), that a private action under RICO was "quasi-criminal in nature"
and that the intent of Congress was to preclude arbitration and limit determinations of
liability to the sole province of Article III courts. See Note, Civil RICO is a Misnomer:
The Need for Criminal Procedural Protections in Actions Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964, 100
HARv. L. REV. 1288 (1987).
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As even the most ardent supporter of arbitration would recognize, the
arbitral process at best places the investor on an equal footing with the
securities-industry personnel against whom the claims are brought. Fur-
thermore, there remains the danger that, at worst, compelling an investor
to arbitrate securities claims puts him in a forum controlled by the securities
industry. This result directly contradicts the goal of both securities acts to
free the investor from the control of the market professional. 7
D. Some Questions Answered
McMahon is the culmination of the judicial reaction to the antiar-
bitration seeds in Wilko and American Safety. As a result, the conclu-
sions reached in both cases are under direct attack and may not survive.'58
More importantly, the emergence of the strong, unitary federal contract
right to arbitrate provides a reliable basis to answer, at the threshold
to arbitration, the Questions posed in conjunction with the franchise
hypothetical in section I(D)(3).
First, the fact that an arbitration clause is contained in a contract
of "adhesion" is no reason to deny enforcement. Although an agreement
to arbitrate which is unconscionable under general principles of state
law could be denied enforcement under the "savings" clause of FAA
section 2,"" there is no evidence of a judicial trend in that direction.
Rather, just the opposite is true."6 Moreover, state efforts to combat
the risk of unfair surprise by requiring a higher standard of assent to
arbitration clauses are displaced by Southland.
Second, the "broad" arbitration clause was interpreted in Mitsubishi
Motors, without more, to include an agreement to arbitrate statutory
rights.
Third, the Court presumes, at the threshold, that arbitration proce-
dures are capable of providing a fair hearing in complex cases and that
arbitrators have the competence to protect the statutory rights of the
parties. So far, there is no indication what evidence ex ante arbitration,
if any, would persuade the Court otherwise.
157. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 260.
158. See, e.g., Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296,
1299 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. granted 109 S. Ct. 389 (1988) (McMahon leads "directly to
the obsolescence of Wilko and the arbitrability of Securities Act § 12(2) claims"); Gemco
Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 671 F. Supp. 972, 978-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
where the court concluded that American Safety had been eroded and that "none of the
justifications for the ... doctrine retain their vigor and that our court of appeals would
now hold that domestic antitrust claims are subject to arbitration." Wilko was overruled
in Ofelia Rodriquez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 57 U.S.L.W. 4539
(May 15, 1989).
159. See Perry v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520, 2527 n.9 (1987) (state law principle "that
takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not
comport with" the requirement of general application in the "savings" clause).
160. In California, at least. See Heily v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 255, 248
Cal. Rptr. 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (claim of former employee against broker subject
to arbitration procedures of the New York Stock Exchange).
190
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Fourth, the Court presumes that an arbitration award can protect
the interests of third persons and vindicate public interests in the dispute
unless Congress has clearly stated that arbitration of those statutory
rights shall not be permitted.
Finally, the Court has concluded that the states have no power to
limit the federal contract right to arbitrate in transactions to which the
FAA applies. Thus, the answers remain constant, except that a state
legislature, no matter how clearly it speaks, cannot change them.
With the final pieces in place, consider this "worst case" scenario.
Return to the franchise example. Suppose that a Franchiser or other
regulated party, well aware of the Supreme Court decisions, decides to
minimize the effect of state regulation of franchise agreements evidencing
a transaction in commerce. Accordingly, it insists upon a broad arbi-
tration clause whether the franchisee likes it or not. If that clause is
otherwise enforceable under the "savings" clause, Prima Paint dictates
that the arbitrator not the court is empowered to decide all of the
claims involving statutory rights and Southland dictates that state efforts
to limit that power are displaced by the FAA. In short, the agreement
to arbitrate will be enforced. But what about judicial review? If the
assumptions underlying the answers above do not pan out in fact, to
what extent can a court under the FAA correct the defects on review
of the final award?
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRAL CAPACITY
A. Judicial Review of the Arbitration Award in General
1. Judicial Review Under the FAA.
(a) Basic Policy. Under our franchise hypothetical, suppose that after
the arbitration is concluded and a final award by the arbitrator is made,
one party claims that the procedures were not effective or that the
statutory rights were improperly applied by the arbitrator. More point-
edly, the losing party claims that there was no fair hearing and that
the arbitrator made errors of fact and law. To what extent can these
claims be reviewed by a court in a motion to vacate a confirmed award
or in subsequent litigation where the preclusive effect of the final award
is urged? Is there a safety valve upon review under the FAA to avoid
the excesses of the federal contract right to arbitrate at the threshold?
The conventional answer is no. An important goal of the parties and
a central objective of arbitration is to obtain a final decision by the
arbitrator of the dispute. Finality is part of the package that supposedly
gives arbitration an advantage over litigation. It is a core ingredient in
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the concept of arbitration."" Even before the enactment of modern-
arbitration legislation, the courts were reluctant to overturn an arbitration
award for errors of fact or law by the arbitrator.'62 This general reluctance
was codified in the FAA,6 ' the Uniform Arbitration Act, 164 and other
modern arbitration statutes.6
Under the FAA, a statutory procedure to vacate or modify under
FAA sections 10 and 11 is invoked through a timely motion after the
arbitrator's final award. This motion may be made whether or not the
other party has filed a motion to confirm and enforce the award.'"
Although the Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to interpret
FAA section 10 since 1968,67 the lower federal courts have been
consistent protectors of finality. As the Second Circuit said in 1972,
the court's function in review is "severely limited ... being confined
to determining whether or not one of the grounds specified ... for
vacation of an award exists."' 68 This limitation was "to further the
objective of arbitration, which is to enable parties to resolve disputes
161. For the rather sparse literature on review, see e.g., Jalet, Judicial Review of
Arbitration." The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 519 (1960); Note, Judicial Deference
to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems of Power and Finality, 23 UCLA L.
REV. 936 (1976); Note, Judicial Supervision of Commercial Arbitration, 53 GEO. L.J.
1079, 1089-92 (1965); Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration" The Role of Public Policy,
58 Nw. U.L. REV. 545 (1963); Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on the
Merits, 63 HARV. L. REV. 681 (1950).
162. See, e.g., Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1854); Wilkins v. Allen,
169 N.Y. 494, 62 N.E. 575 (1902) (arbitrator's determination either as to the law or the
facts is final and conclusive unless perverse misconstruction is plainly established); W.
Sturges, Commercial Arbitration and Award § 366 (1930).
163. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 & 11 (1982).
164. Uniform Arbitration Act, 7 U.L.A. §§ 12 & 13 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
165. See, e.g., Section 7511 of the New York Arbitration Act, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L.
& R. § 7514 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1989) and Section 1286 of the California Arbitration
Act, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280-1298.8 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989).
166. Under the FAA, it is contemplated that the arbitrator's final award will be
delivered to the parties. Either party then has three months in which to file a motion to
"vacate, modify, or correct an award." Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 12 (1982).
If a timely motion is filed, the grounds and procedures for vacation or modification are
set forth in FAA §§ 10 & 11.
Within one year after the award, however, either party may file a motion under FAA
§ 9 to confirm the final award. The court "must" grant an order to confirm unless the
award has been vacated or corrected under FAA §§ 10 or 11. When an award is confirmed,
the court will enter a judgment on the award and enforce it in the normal manner.
Note that the statutory procedures to vacate or correct a final award are, when timely
invoked, available whether the award has been confirmed or not. If, however, the statutory
procedures are not available, the finality of the award, whether confirmed or not, will
usually be preserved by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See generally
Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA
L. REV. 623, 639-57 (1988).
167. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145
(1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 1112 (1985), which wrestled with the meaning of "evident
partiality" in FAA § 10(b).
168. Office of Supply, Gov't of Republic of Korea v. New York Navigation Co., Inc.,
469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972) (citation omitted).
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promptly and inexpensively, without resort to litigation and often without
any requirement that the arbitrators state the rationale behind their
decision."' 169 More recently, courts have affirmed that the "strong policy"
favoring "voluntary commercial arbitration" requires that the judicial
review of an arbitration award be "narrowly limited"'17 and that section
10 of the FAA provides the "exclusive grounds for challenging an
arbitration award within its purview. "'7 Thus, under FAA section 10,
the announced policy favoring finality suggests that a corrective or
"safety valve" to the federal contract right to arbitrate is not readily
available when issues of arbitral capacity are raised. 72
(b) Statutory Grounds Under the FAA. Under FAA section 10, there
are two potential opportunities to obtain judicial review of claimed
defects in capacity in the arbitrator's award. They are where the
arbitrators "exceeded their powers"''7  or engaged in "misconduct" in
the conduct of the hearing. 74 Other statutory grounds, such as fraud
by the parties to the arbitration 75 or partiality or corruption in the
169. Id.
170. Revere Copper & Brass v. Overseas Private Inv., 628 F.2d 81, 83 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1981).
171. LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum, 791 F.2d 1334,
1338 (9th Cir. 1986). This firm stance under the FAA was reinforced in 1987 when the
Supreme Court, in a labor dispute, upheld an arbitrator's award under a collective
bargaining agreement despite claims that the arbitrator failed to conduct a fair evidentiary
hearing and that the award was against public policy. United Paperworkers Int'l. Union
v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987). Although not bound by FAA § 10 in a labor
dispute, the Court looked to the FAA for guidance. Id. at 372. See generally Edwards,
Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash Between the Public Policy
Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3 (1988); Ray, Court Review
of Labor Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 32 VILL. L. REv. 57
(1987).
172. Until recently in Great Britain, the arbitrator could be required by the parties
or the court to state issues of law arising before or as part of the award for review by
the "High Court." Section 21(1) of the Arbitration Act of 1950. See Sayre, The Devel-
opment of Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 607-08 (1928) (origins of "case
stated" procedure). In 1979, however, Parliament sharply limited the "case stated"
procedure and abolished the jurisdiction of the High Court to vacate an award because
of errors of law "on the face of the award." Arbitration Act, 1979, 27 & 28 Eliz. 2, c.
42, § 1(1). The 1979 Act requires the arbitrator to give a reasoned award and permits
a right of appeal to the High Court "on any question of law arising out of an award
made on an arbitration agreement." Id. at § 1(2). The High Court will grant leave to
appeal only if all parties consent or if it "considers that, having regard to all the
circumstances, the determination of the question of law concerned could substantially
affect the rights of one or more of the parties to the arbitration agreement." Id. at §
1(4). Finally, the 1979 Act grants the parties to international arbitrations broad power
to contract out of the limited right to appeal questions of law. Id. at § 1(5). See generally
Samuel, The 1979 Arbitration Act-Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on the Merits
in England, 2 J. INTL ARB., No. 4, 53 (1985).
173. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1982).
174. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1982).
175. A court will vacate where one party obtained the award by "corruption, fraud,
or other undue means." Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1982). Although this
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
arbitrators76 are normally not relevant when arbitral capacity is challenged.
(i) Arbitrator Exceeded Authority. A court may vacate an award
where (a) there was never an enforceable agreement to arbitrate or (b)
the arbitrator otherwise exceeded his authority, as defined by the agree-
ment and his office.1
77
It is probably too late to claim for the first time that there was no
agreement to arbitrate after the award has been made." This objection
is usually raised at the threshold. Nevertheless, the courts have consid-
ered, with uneven results, whether the arbitrator has exceeded his
authority in interpreting the contract"9 or granting a particular remedy,
such as specific performance."' Even though there may be no written
opinion by the arbitrator, the courts are willing to review the result
against the issues presented and the contract to see whether the decision
exception applies whether or not capacity problems are alleged, it obviously affords no
assistance in capacity disputes where there is no fraud by one or both parties. The focal
point here is upon improper means employed by one party to obtain the award rather
than the partiality or misconduct of the arbitrator. The courts have been cautious in this
arena. Thus, where fraud is alleged, the party seeking to vacate the award must prove
it by clear and convincing evidence. In addition, the fraud must be material to an issue
in the arbitration and must not have been discoverable by the exercise of due diligence
prior to the arbitration. See Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (11th
Cir. 1988), where the court vacated the award on the ground that the plaintiff's expert
had completely falsified his credentials.
176. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1982), provides grounds for vacatur
where there is "evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators .... " But what is
"evident partiality ... in the arbitrator ... ?" Although the courts now agree that proof
of actual partiality is not required, see Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 1112 (1985), there is some
disagreement on what evidence short of that is needed to show "evident" partiality. The
focus is upon what relationships and contacts the arbitrator should have disclosed at the
time of selection rather than the impact of nondisclosure on the actual award. This inquiry
is complicated by the fact that an experienced arbitrator in a particular trade or industry
will undoubtedly have definite opinions and past and perhaps current relationships with
one or both parties. A trade off is required that will rarely be helpful in disputes over
capacity. See Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983), where the court, speaking through Judge Posner, said:
"The expert adjudicator is more likely than a judge or juror not only to be precommitted
to a particular substantive position but to know or have heard of the parties (or if the
parties are organizations, their key people)." According to Judge Posner: "If the circum-
stances are such that a man of average probity might reasonably be suspected of partiality,
maybe the language of Section 10(b) can be stretched to require disqualification. But
the circumstances must be powerfully suggestive of bias." Id. at 681. Compare Morelite
Constr. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d
Cir. 1984), where the test was whether a "reasonable person" would have to conclude
that, if all the facts were known, the arbitrator was partial to one party.
177. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(d), which authorizes a vacatur where the
arbitrators "exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final,
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."
178. So holding is Comprehensive Accounting Corp. v. Rudell, 760 F.2d 138 (7th
Cir. 1985).
179. See Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin., Ltd., 667 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
180. See, e.g., Island Creek Coal Sales v. City of Gainesville, 729 F.2d 1046 (6th
Cir. 1984).
194
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drew its essence from or was in manifest disregard of the agreement.
In close cases, however, doubts will be resolved in favor of authority.'
Note that this route to vacatur does not depend upon a showing that
the arbitration proceedings were ineffective or that the arbitrator made
errors of law or fact. Rather, the result is articulated in terms of
exceeding the authority granted by the agreement to arbitrate or, at a
minimum, insuring that an issue clearly in the case was actually decided.'2
(ii) Misconduct by the Arbitrator. Another statutory ground that
could be relevant to capacity is where the arbitrator was "guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced."''
In this catchall provision, it is the arbitrator's misconduct or mis-
behavior in conducting the hearing rather than the effectiveness of the
procedures when well conducted that is under scrutiny. The arbitrator's
misconduct must "so prejudice the rights of a party that it denies the
party a fundamentally fair hearing. ' " Without more, however, FAA
section 10(c) seems to assume the parties are entitled to some hearing
without delineating the nature or requirements of a fair hearing. 8 Thus,
unless the parties have otherwise agreed,'86 the arbitrator's discretion in
determining the nature and scope of the hearing is reviewed with a pro-
arbitration bias under the vague fundamental fairness standard and a
search for misconduct." 7 Put differently, it is doubtful that a party is
181. See French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 784 F.2d 902 (9th Cir.
1986), where the court was prepared to resolve all doubts in favor of authority "unless
it may be said with positive, assurance that the (agreement) is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the award." Id. at 908.
182. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 638
(1985), where the court stated in dictum: "while the efficacy of the arbitral process
requires that substantive review at the award-enforcement stage remain minimal, it would
not require intrusive inquiry to ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust
claims and actually decided them." Id. at 637, n.19.
183. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1982).
184. Apex Fountain Sales v. Kleinfeld, 818 F.2d 1089, 1094 (3d Cir. 1987).
185. See Federal District Ins. Corp. v. Air Florida System, Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 842
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1289 (1988), where the court refused to hold
that the petitioner was entitled to an oral hearing when a "paper" hearing was adequate
for the resolution of the issue presented.
186. One frequent "otherwise" is to incorporate the AAA Arbitration Rules by reference
into the contract. Rule 37 provides that the parties have a right to an oral hearing unless
waived. American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rules Rule 37 (1986).
Furthermore, Rule 31 provides that the parties "may offer such evidence as is relevant
and material to the dispute and shall produce such additional evidence as the Arbitrator
may deem necessary to an understanding and determination of the dispute." Id. at Rule
31.
187. In United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987), a
dispute arising under a collective bargaining agreement, the Court considered whether
the arbitrator's refusal to consider certain evidence amounted to "misconduct" under FAA
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denied a fundamentally fair hearing simply because the arbitration
procedures were, arguably, inadequate to deal with the complexity of
the issue presented."'8
(c) Non-Statutory Grounds. At the conclusion of the arbitration
hearing, there should be a record of the evidence, both written and
oral, admitted for consideration by the arbitrator. The arbitrator, how-
ever, may or may not prepare a written opinion to justify the award.
If not, the parties and any reviewing court will not know for sure what
facts the arbitrator found to be established and persuasive, what law
was applied or how the arbitrator justified the result. Consequently, it
is difficult for a court to determine whether the arbitrator made any
errors of fact or law. In short, the merits of the award are obscured.
To counteract this problem, a number of potential non-statutory
grounds have evolved. They are, however, rarely invoked by a court as
the basis for vacating an award. They include claims that the award
was "completely irrational"8 9 or "against public" policy or that the
arbitrator was in "manifest disregard" of the law.
(i) Award Against Public Policy. Occasionally, a losing party will
attack on the grounds that the award is against public policy. For
example, the arbitrator might award punitive damages for breach of
contract even though this remedy would not be available if the matter
were litigated in court.'1 In these cases, the court could vacate the
award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority' or
because the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of applicable law.
But if the arbitrator has authority and has not disregarded applicable
§ 10(c). The Court noted that if the dispute was arbitrable, procedural questions were
left to the arbitrator. Even if there was error in refusing to consider evidence, it was not
"misconduct" unless the error was in "bad faith or so gross as to amount to affirmative
misconduct." The remedy for misconduct is to vacate the award, not to decide the merits.
Id. at 372.
188. A final statutory ground is where the arbitrator made a mistake in description,
a miscalculation of figures, or issued an award imperfect in form, but one which did not
affect the merits. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 11, 10(d) (1982).
189. The claim that an award is "completely irrational" overlaps with the statutory
ground that the arbitrator may not exceed his authority. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(d) (1982). Thus, where issues in the interpretation and application of the contract
are involved, and the arbitrator's decision, when compared with the contract and the
record, is excessive, a court might conclude either that the arbitrator exceeded his powers
or that the decision was "completely irrational." See Swift Industries, Inc. v. Botany
Industries, Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1129-31 (3d Cir. 1972). Compare Shearson Hayden Stone,
Inc. v. Liang, 653 F.2d 310, 312 (7th Cir. 1981). This approach, however, will not work
if the court is persuaded that the arbitrator's decision drew its support from the essence
of the contract.
190. See generally Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration:L Garrity v. Lyle
Stuart, Inc., Reconsidered, 66 B.U.L. Rav. 953 (1986).
191. See John T. Brady & Co. v. Form-EZE Systems, Inc., 623 F.2d 261 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1062 (1980) (suggestion that the public policy defense was another
way of concluding that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority).
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law and Congress had not clearly invalidated agreements to arbitrate
the particular claim, the room for the public policy defense is sharply
proscribed. As one court put it, the award must be "so misconceived
that it 'compels the violation of law or conduct contrary to accepted
public policy.' "192
(ii) Award in Manifest Disregard of Law. In Wilko v. Swan,'" the
Supreme Court, in dicta, stated that "the interpretation of the law by
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in federal
courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation."' 94 Conceding that
this nonstatutory standard of review is "extremely limited," the "manifest
disregard" of law standard for vacating an award has been adopted in
the Second'95 and Ninth Circuits 96
What is "manifest disregard" of the law? How is one to distinguish
an interpretation of law that is simply "clearly erroneous"? Earlier, the
Second Circuit expressed doubt about finding an answer: "One man's
192. Revere Copper & Brass v. Overseas Private Inv., 628 F.2d 81, 83 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980) (quoting Union Employers Division of Printing
Industry, Inc. v. Columbia Typographical Union No. 101, 353 F. Supp. 1348, 1349 (D.D.C.
1973) and refusing to vacate award). Accord Dispulse Corp. of America v. Carba, Ltd.,
626 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1980), where the court stated that the award must compel the
violation of law or be "contrary to well accepted and deep rooted public policy." Id. at
1110. The Supreme Court's decision in United Paperworkers Inter. Union v. Misco, Inc.,
108 S. Ct. 364, 373-75 (1987), reveals an even more constricted position. In a dispute
under a collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator reinstated an employee who had
been discharged for the alleged possession and use of controlled substances on the employer's
premises. The district court had vacated the award and the court of appeals affirmed on
the ground that reinstatement would violate the public policy against the operation of
dangerous machinery by persons under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The Supreme
Court reversed and reinstated the award, primarily on the ground that the arbitrator had
concluded, from the evidence before him, that there was no just cause for dismissal under
the collective bargaining agreement. It was inappropriate for the lower courts to draw a
contrary inference: "The parties did not bargain for the facts to be found by a court,
but by an arbitrator chosen by them who had more opportunity to observe (the employee)
and to be familiar with the plant and its problems." Id. at 374. Even so, the Court stated
that for an award based upon the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement to
be against public policy, two things must be established: (1) the policy must be ascertained
by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of
supposed public policy; and (2) the violation of public policy must be clearly shown. Since
neither condition was satisfied, it was improper to vacate an award made in accordance
with an otherwise valid collective bargaining agreement.
193. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
194. Id. at 436-37. Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, agreed that "(a)rbitrators may not
disregard the law." Id. at 440.
195. E.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34
(2d Cir. 1986).
196. See, e.g., French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 784 F.2d 902 (9th
Cir. 1986). Other circuits, without expressly adopting the standard, have applied the
"manifest disregarding" standard along with the statutory grounds in refusing to vacate
an award. See, e.g., Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 477 U.S. 1141 (1986); MSP Collaborative v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 596
F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1979).
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'interpretation' may be another's 'disregard.' ",197 More recently the court
has refined the test:
Manifest disregard requires something beyond and different from a mere
error in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or
apply the law .... Manifest disregard of the law may be found ... if the
arbitrator understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore
it. 199
Moreover:
The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly
perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator. Moreover,
the term "disregard" implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence
of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no
attention to it .... Judicial inquiry under the "manifest disregard" standard
is therefore extremely limited. The governing law alleged to have been
ignored by the arbitrators must be well defined, explicit, and clearly
applicable. We are not at liberty to set aside an arbitration panel's award
because of an arguable difference regarding the meaning or applicability
of laws urged upon it.'"
Under this test, arbitrators have considerable latitude to err in the
interpretation and application of statutory rights without being in "man-
ifest disregard" of the law. These rights may be difficult to state and
hard to apply to complex facts. Moreover, if the arbitrator does not
prepare a written opinion, the applicable law cannot be delineated and
analyzed. It will be difficult to determine whether the arbitrator iden-
tified applicable law and proceeded to reach a contrary position in spite
of it. Thus, even though the court may inquire into the basis of an
award, there will rarely be a non-statutory ground for vacating the
award.
In sum, neither the statutory nor the non-statutory grounds for vacating
an award offer a reliable corrective for capacity defects which emerge
during the course of the arbitration.'
B. Claim and Issue Preclusion as a Limitation on Review
1. Preclusion in Commercial Arbitration. The finality objective in
arbitration is complemented by the policies of efficient and effective
197. I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 432 (2d Cir.
1974).
198. Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 892-93 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations
omitted).
199. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d
Cir. 1986).
200. Compare Motomura, Arbitration and Collateral Estoppel: Using Preclusion to
Shape Procedural Choices, 63 TUL. L. REv. 29, 37-45 (1988).
198
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judicial administration which underlie the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. Res judicata, now called claim preclusion, bars a
subsequent suit based upon the same claim involving the same parties
or persons in privity with these parties and any claim or cause of action
that could have been arbitrated3°' Collateral estoppel, now called issue
preclusion, bars the relitigation of an issue identical to one involved in
the prior proceeding which was actually contested and necessary to the
final award. In addition, the party precluded must have been a party
to the proceeding and had a full and fair opportunity to present the
relevant evidence?02
Both doctrines have been applied when one party seeks to relitigate
in court claims and issues of fact previously decided by an arbitrator. °3
The application, however, has been on a case by case basis which takes
into account the differences between arbitration and judicial proceed-
ings.2 Thus, some courts have been reluctant to give preclusive effect
to decisions where the differences between the previous arbitration and
adjudication in court were pronounced? °5 Based upon the conclusion
that arbitration is fundamentally different from litigation, Professor Shell
has argued that, in commercial arbitration at least, the policies justifying
the preclusion doctrines are not appropriate for arbitral proceedings
unless the parties have intended to give the arbitrator's decision preclusive
effect.' Since arbitration is a consensual not a public institution, the
intention of the parties rather than a case by case analysis to see if
the particular arbitration was sufficiently like litigation is a preferable
basis for determining preclusion.
2. Limitations Upon Preclusion in Labor Arbitration. in labor ar-
bitration, a distinction between rights arising under a collective bar-
gaining agreement and rights created by the Constitution or legislation
has been made in the judicial review of labor arbitration awards. In
this process, the FAA does not bind the courts, although its provisions
are sometimes applied by analogy?"7
201. Shell, supra note 11, at 639-40.
202. Id. at 647-48. See also Motomura, supra note 200.
203. A leading case is Goldstein v. Doft, 236 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd,
353 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 960 (1966). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 (1982); Mobilia, Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel
Arising Out of Non-Judicial Proceedings, 50 ALB. L. REv. 305 (1986).
204. See Shell, supra note 11, at 641-47 (claim preclusion) and 649-54 (issue preclusion).
See also Motomura, supra note 200, at 33-37, 45-52.
205. This is especially true for where issue preclusion is involved. If the arbitrator
has not prepared a written opinion and informal or inadequate procedures have impaired
one party's opportunity to present issues, it will be difficult to determine what factual
issues were actually decided, much less to decide whether they were decided after a "fair
and full" opportunity to litigate. See Shell, supra note 11, at 649-54.
206. Id. at 658-73.
207. See Ray, Court Review of Labor Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration
Act, 32 VILL. L. REV. 57 (1987).
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When the award involves the interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court has been a firm
supporter of finality. From the so-called "Steel Workers Trilogy" 8
through the recent Misco decision, 9 the Court has been clear that the
courts "play only a limited role when asked to review the decision of
an arbitrator" and "are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an
award even though the parties may allege that the award rests on errors
of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract.""21 As long as the award
"draws its essence" from the collective bargaining agreement, it will be
enforced.
A different analysis is employed where important constitutional or
statutory rights are involved. If the award decides employee rights
created by Congress, such as civil rights protected in 42 U.S.C. section
1983 or antidiscrimination rights created under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,1" the Court has taken a different approach to
review. In a series of decisions, starting with Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 2 the Court has both questioned the capacity of arbitration
to decide the statutory claims and rejected the argument that a reviewing
court was automatically precluded from considering the issue if previ-
ously decided by the arbitrator.2"3 Rather, the arbitrator's decision should
be admitted in a de novo hearing to determine what deference, if any,
the court should give to the award.
The Court rejected automatic preclusion in two steps. First, the
Alexander court stressed the limitations of arbitration and arbitrators
in deciding statutory rights in the labor context. Thus, arbitration, as
an informal procedure, was not the equivalent of courts in either fact
finding or the establishment of a complete record. Further, the arbi-
trator's role was limited to effectuating the "intent of the parties rather
than the requirements of enacted legislation ' 24 and the "specialized
competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not
the law of the land. '21 5 Finally, in labor arbitration, arbitrators are
208. In particular, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
209. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
210. Id. at 370.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
212. 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
213. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, 450 U.S. 728 (1981), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985), after remand, 750 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1984) (claims created
by Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); McDonald
v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (claims created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982)). The cases are well discussed in Motomura, supra note 200, at 46-50; Comment,
Arbitral Deference and the Right to Make and Enforce Contracts Under 42 U.S.C. §
1981, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 109, 116-22 (1988).
214. 415 U.S. at 56-57.
215. Id. at 57.
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required to follow the language of the collective bargaining agreement
even though it conflicts with statutory law. This creates the risk that
the "interests of the individual employee may be subordinated to the
collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit. ' ' 216 In the
view of the Court, these capacity limitations in arbitration were incon-
sistent with automatic issue preclusion.
Second, the Alexander Court, in a footnote, set forth the factors
relevant to a determination of how much deference the reviewing court
should give to the award.
We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral decision
(in Title VII cases), since this must be determined in the court's discretion
with regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Relevant factors
include the existence of provisions in the collective bargaining agreement
that conform substantially with Title VII, the degree of procedural fairness
in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with respect to the issue of
discrimination, and the special competence of particular arbitrators. Where
an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an employee's Title
VII rights, a court may properly accord it great weight. This is especially
true where the issue is solely one of fact, specially addressed by the parties
and decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an adequate record. But
courts should ever be mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought
it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of
discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of courts to assure the
full availability of this forum. 27
Although the Court has yet to apply these factors to a particular
case, it seems clear that the approach has been endorsed for all cases
where claimed statutory rights are decided against the individual em-
ployee in labor arbitration.218 Yet in none of these cases did Congress
clearly provide that only a court and not an arbitrator could decide the
dispute. Put differently, although the Court, under the test announced
in McMahon, would have enforced the agreement to arbitrate at the
threshold, it was prepared to review the merits of the decision on
statutory rights after the award was made.
3. Issue Preclusion Under the FAA. To date, the Court has not
decided whether the approach of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. to
216. Id. at 58 n.19.
217. Id. at 60 n.22. The footnote has been repeated with approval in both Barrentine,
450 U.S. at 743 n.22, and McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292 n.13.
218. But see Comment, supra note 213, at 109, where the author questions the
application of Gardner-Denver to disputes arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Compare
Johnson v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union Local No. 23, 828 F.2d
961, 966 (3d Cir. 1987), where the court distinguished employee rights "grounded in
specific statutory provisions designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to
individual workers" from obligations incurred through contract or estoppel rather than
"statutory entitlements."
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issue preclusion will be applied to the judicial review of awards deciding
statutory rights which are subject to the FAA.2' 9 The issue would arise
if, after an arbitrator decided a statutory claim against the protected
party, a law suit to enforce the claim rather than a petition to vacate
the award were filed. An obvious defense would be that the arbitrator's
decision on the statutory claim was res judicata.
On one level, there is an apparent fit. There is a similar distinction
between rights created by the contract and rights created by legislation
regulating those contracts and there are similar concerns about the
capacity of arbitration adequately to adjudicate the statutory rights.
Furthermore, since Congress created the statutory rights one might infer
an intention to insure enforcement in a judicial forum. As the Court
put it in the McDonald case, "rejection of a rule of preclusion ... and
our rejection of a rule of deferral ... were based in large part on our
conclusion that Congress intended the statutes at issue in those cases
to be judicially enforceable and that arbitration could not provide an
adequate substitute for judicial proceedings in adjudicating claims under
those statutes."'" One could predict, therefore, that the Court might
adopt this approach if the procedures were in fact inadequate or the
arbitrator made a mistake in the interpretation and application of the
law. 2
On another level, there are problems with taking this step. First,
FAA sections 10 & 11 limit the scope of review by providing what
some courts have called the exclusive grounds for review of commercial
arbitration awards. Since the FAA does not apply in labor arbitration,
the Supreme Court did not have to consider its potential limitations on
judicial reyiew in the Alexander-Gardner cases. A possible interpretation
of the FAA, therefore, is that an arbitrator's award is final unless
vacated under the statutory or nonstatutory grounds, as interpreted by
the courts. Under this interpretation, the presumption of issue preclusion
219. The approach, as expressed in McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284
(1984), was cited with apparent approval in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213 (1985). Byrd, however, did not involve the judicial review of an award under the
FAA. Rather, the question was whether arbitration or litigation should proceed first in a
dispute that contained some issues that were arbitrable and some issues that were not.
The Court held that arbitration must go first. In dealing with the argument that the
arbitrator's award might have some preclusive effect in the subsequent litigation of
nonarbitrable claims, the Court, among other things, suggested that the arbitration pro-
ceedings would not necessarily have a preclusive effect on subsequent federal court
proceedings. Citing McDonald, the Court stated that the courts have power to determine
the scope of preclusion after award and that "in framing preclusion rules in this context,
courts take into account the federal interests warranting protection." Id. at 223.
220. So holding is C.D. Anderson & Co. v. Lemos, 832 F.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (9th
Cir. 1987).
221. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984).
222. See, e.g., Note, The Preclusive Effect of Arbitral Determinations in Subsequent
Federal Securities Litigation, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 655 (1987).
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remains to complement the FAA's finality policy, should the issue arise
in a context other than a motion to vacate.m2
Second, there are differences between commercial and labor arbitra-
tion, primarily in degree of involvement of the individual in creating
contract rights and the nature of the rights likely to be created by
statute. A party to a commercial contract is not represented by a union.
For better or for worse, he represents himself. Further, the rights created
by regulatory legislation are farther removed from what might be called
fundamental constitutional guarantees, whether or not implemented by
federal legislation. The limitations of arbitration, therefore, pose risks
of a lesser magnitude to individuals asserting statutory claims arising
from the regulation of commercial or consumer transactions.", These
exceptions to issue preclusion, therefore, could easily be limited to
collective bargaining agreements not otherwise governed by the FAA.
Third, under McMahon, unless Congress has clearly stated that
arbitrable rights created by statute cannot be arbitrated, the court will
order arbitration at the threshold. Arbitral capacity is presumed. If so,
can a legislative intention to preserve access to a federal court to protect
the federal interest after the award has been made be inferred? Put
differently, if Congress did not clearly remove the dispute from arbi-
tration at the threshold, how can an intention that the statutory rights
be judicially enforceable be inferred after award? If this inference is
not possible, a denial of preclusive effect could undermine the federal
contract right to arbitrate. "
223. Courts give preclusive effect to unconfirmed but final arbitration awards. Shell,
supra note 11, at 642 n.95.
224. Compare Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, 806 F.2d 291, 297
(1st Cir. 1986) where, in enforcing an agreement to arbitrate rights created by the 1934
Securities Act, the court distinguished the line of cases starting with Gardner-Denver:
(W)e note the express private right of action contained in the federal statutes at
issue there, and that, at least with respect to (those cases) the federal statute at
issue involved adjudication of the rights of an individual under the Constitution,
an inquiry that, with all due respect to arbitration, has historically been the sole
province of Article III adjudication.
Id. at 298.
The court concluded that the securities law implicates rights more akin to "the sort
of commercial dispute that, absent a clear indication from Congress to the contrary, we
would readily approve as arbitrable." Id.
225. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. at 289:
Our rejection of a rule of preclusion . . . and our rejection of a rule of deferral
... were based in large part on our conclusion that Congress intended the statutes
at issue in those cases to be judicially enforceable and that arbitration could not
provide an adequate substitute for judicial proceedings in adjudicating claims under
those statutes.
See Steele v. L. F. Rothschild & Co., Inc., 701 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), where
the court refused to apply the reasoning of Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Systems,
471 U.S. 1054 (1985) to a threshold dispute between a nonunion employee and an employer
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Following McMahon, the court could find no evidence
that Congress intended to preclude arbitration under the FLSA and concluded that
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The policy question is clear: If an arbitrator's award against statutory
rights has not been vacated or modified under FAA sections 10 & 11,
should a court be able to inquire whether those rights were given full
consideration under adequate procedures and decided according to law
by a competent arbitrator? If the answer is yes, the rule of issue preclusion
which normally complements FAA section 10 must give way to the
Gardner-Denver standards for deference, which require a case by case
analysis. Such a review ex post award would, arguably, undermine the
federal contract right to arbitrate for the very same reasons that were
rejected as grounds to deny enforcement by the Court at the threshold? 6
In sum, modern arbitration law tends to shield the merits of the
disputes over statutory rights from judicial review at both the threshold
and the award stage. At the threshold, however, the Supreme Court
assumes that the practice of arbitration is effective and the dispute is
otherwise appropriate for arbitration if the parties have agreed to ar-
bitrate. If a valid agreement exists, arbitration will be compelled unless
Congress has clearly stated otherwise. If a final award is made, the
award will be confirmed and enforced under the FAA unless egregious
disruptions in process and procedure have occurred. The question "what
disputes are appropriate for arbitration," if raised at all, is subsumed
in the enthusiastic support for this ancient form of private adjudication
and cannot easily be raised in court at either the threshold or the review
stage.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has yet to consider the standard
for review of an award deciding statutory rights created by Congress
or by the states under the FAA. As the foregoing discussion reveals,
there are opportunities for closer judicial scrutiny, but they run counter
to the historical preference for finality manifested in the FAA and the
cluster of policies in and around the doctrines of claim and issue
preclusion.
that McMahon rejected the view "that arbitral tribunals are incompetent for resolution
of the public law and policy considerations underlying the FLSA." Id. at 408. But see
Ferreri v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D. Pa. 1987), where the
court, without exploring the question of legislative intention, actually reviewed the record
and concluded that the "arbitration in this case did provide a fair, complete and adequate
substitute for a judicial trial." Id. at 1187.
226. Distinguishing between claim and issue preclusion, Professor Motomura has argued
that arbitral findings should never be subject to issue preclusion in subsequent litigation
unless the agreement clearly and expressly provides for it. In this, he agrees with Professor
Shell that preclusion should depend upon the intention of the parties to the arbitration
agreement rather than how closely the arbitration procedure resembles litigation. Further,
a rule that predictably denies collateral estoppel effect will avoid unnecessary discour-
agement of arbitration and undesirable pressure on arbitration to become more like
litigation. As a result, a court which has doubts about the wisdom of ordering arbitration
can predict when the preclusion doctrines will or will not apply. If preclusion is foreclosed
by the parties clear agreement, the court should have less reluctance to enforce the
agreement to arbitrate. Motomura, supra note 200, at 80-81.
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V. CONCLUSION: DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM
A. The Problem Restated
In this Article I have examined agreements to arbitrate statutory
rights created either by Congress or the state legislatures. It is in this
regulatory setting that capacity differences between arbitration and court
adjudication are most likely to emerge. Because arbitration is different
from litigation, limitations on procedural effectiveness and appropriate-
ness can hamper the vindication of statutory rights. Two other factors
combine to exacerbate these potential limitations: (1) there may be a
power imbalance between the parties to the agreement, the stronger of
which is the regulated party; and (2) the Supreme Court has created
a unitary and preemptive federal contract right to arbitrate under the
FAA. These circumstances cast a pall over the current enthusiasm for
arbitration."7 Why?
First, the bargaining power imbalance suggested by the phrase "con-
tract of adhesion" raises a continuing question about the quality of
assent to arbitration. In this context, where the dominant party is the
regulated party, any analysis that celebrates the apparent intention of
the parties to arbitrate statutory rights is suspect. Furthermore, any
solution that depends primarily upon the intention of the parties should
be rejected. Unlike the securities industry,22 there is no federal or state
agency charged with monitoring the quality of arbitration practices and
procedures. Thus, the monitoring is left to private institutions, such as
the AAA, and the uncertain pressure of industry trade associations.
Second, the development by the Supreme Court of a strong, preemp-
tive federal contract right to arbitrate ignores the limitations of arbi-
tration at the threshold. Unless Congress has clearly stated that federal
statutory rights are not appropriate for arbitration, the courts are directed
to order arbitration despite doubts about arbitral effectiveness. Fur-
thermore, in cases to which the FAA applies, the Supreme Court has
displaced state law which limits the federal contract right to arbitrate
statutory rights created by the state. In short, there is little room for
doubts about arbitral capacity to intrude at the threshold to arbitration.
Third, the doctrine of separability, under a "broad" arbitration clause,
cedes to the arbitrator rather than the court the power to decide whether
227. See, e.g., Burger, Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, 40 ARB. J. No. 4, 3
(1985).
228. On the oversight role by the SEC in the securities industry, see Fletcher, Learning
to Live with the Federal Arbitration Act--Securities Litigation in a Post-McMahon
World, 37 EMORY L. J. 99 (1988). This potential control has influenced courts at the
threshold to enforce agreements to arbitrate fraud claims. See Perace v. E.F. Hutton
Group, Inc., 828 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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the underlying contract is enforceable under the "savings" clause in
FAA section 2 and the merits of the statutory claim. Furthermore, the
objective of finality which underlies the "classic" model of arbitration
is reinforced in the limited statutory grounds to vacate an award under
the FAA and in the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion. This
effectively limits if not forecloses judicial review of the merits of the
arbitrator's decision.
These developments create an incentive for organizations subject to
federal or state regulation to use arbitration as a device to blunt or
break social legislation, especially where the agreement to arbitrate is
contained in a standard form prepared by the regulated party.29 Even
if the arbitral practices and procedures are neutral, the limited capacity
of arbitration in disputes over statutory rights coupled with the finality
of the award could water down the protection provided for the other
party, if not undermine the public policies underlying the regulatory
legislation.
B. Some Directions for Reform
In essence, the arbitration of statutory rights creates a problem of
consumer protection230 in the hazy areas between commercial and labor
arbitration and federal and state law. But unlike commercial arbitration,
where the limitations of arbitration may be strengths, statutory rights
pose issues of public law which require a vindication that arbitration
may be unable consistently to provide. In this area, therefore, the need
to preserve the classic model of arbitration as a distinct alternative to
litigation is less compelling. What are the most promising directions for
reform?
1. The Role of Private Agreement: The Decision in Volt Information
Sciences. Accepting this, solutions that depend primarily upon the
agreement of the parties should be rejected, especially where the effect
is to favor arbitration in derogation of statutory rights. Under this
approach, the presumption, rejected by the Court in Mitsubishi Motors,
that statutory rights are not arbitrable unless explicitly included in the
agreement makes good sense and should have been adopted. Furthermore,
the suggestion, made by Professor Motomura, ' that a final award should
have no collateral estoppel effects unless the parties have clearly agreed
otherwise is suspect in disputes over statutory rights. Agreement man-
229. Compare the dissent of Judge Clark in Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d
Cir.), rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
230. See Note, Resolving the Conflict Between Arbitration Clauses and Claims Under
Unfair and Deceptive Practices Acts, 64 B.U.L. REV. 377 (1984) (consumer credit claims
should not be arbitrated under state law).
231. Motomura, supra note 200, at 80-81.
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ifested in an arbitration clause drafted by the regulated party, no matter
how clear, should never be sufficient to insulate the final award from
review for capacity defects.
On the other hand, if the parties clearly agree not to arbitrate or to
exclude statutory rights from arbitration, that agreement will be enforced
under the FAA. 2 But what about agreements to arbitrate under the
law of a state which limits the arbitration of statutory rights? Should
those agreements be enforced?
The general question was raised and partially answered by the Su-
preme Court in Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University. 3 The parties to a construction
contract agreed, (1) to arbitrate "all disputes ... 'arising out of or
relating to this contract or the breach thereof ... '" and (2) that the
"Contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the Project
is located," namely California.- The transaction, however, evidenced
commerce and was subject to the FAA."- A dispute arose over com-
pensation for extra work. No state created statutory rights were involved.
Rather, the Board of Trustees sought to stay arbitration under a pro-
cedural rule, section 1281.2(c) of the California Arbitration Act, pending
litigation with other companies who were involved in the construction
project but not parties to the arbitration agreement. There was, however,
no provision authorizing a stay of arbitration in the FAA. Furthermore,
the California procedural rule appeared to conflict with federal policy
requiring arbitration first and litigation second.26 Nevertheless, the Cal-
ifornia Court of Appeals affirmed a stay of arbitration under section
1281.2(c) and the Supreme Court took appellate jurisdiction.2137
The Court, in a six to two decision, affirmed. After first concluding
that the choice of law agreement, properly interpreted, did incorporate
the California procedural rule,2' 32 the Court confronted the more difficult
question: Was section 1281.2(c) preempted by the FAA even though
232. Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 109 S. Ct. 1248, 1255
(1989) (FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so,
nor does it prevent parties who do agree to arbitrate from excluding certain claims from
the scope of their arbitration agreement).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1251 and n.1.
235. Id.
236. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
237. 109 S. Ct. 1248, 1252, n.4. 238. The Court rejected the argument that the
238. The Court rejected the argument that the choice of law constituted a "waiver"
of a federally guaranteed right. Rather, the parties had no federal rights beyond the scope
of the agreement. Furthermore, there was no violation of the dictate that interpretation,
a state law question, be done with "due regard" to the federal policy favoring arbitration.
That policy was not offended when the agreement incorporated a "certain set of procedural
rules" in a code that generally fostered the federal policy. The "federal policy is simply
to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate."
Id. at 1253.
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the parties had agreed to use it? The answer was no. The court noted
that the FAA displaced state law only "to the extent that it actually
conflicts with" the goals and policies of the FAA. An important policy
is to require "courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to
arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms. '23 9 This
policy did not prevent the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under
different rules:
Where, as here, the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of
arbitration, enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement
is fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is that
arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit it to go
forward. 240
The Volt case, although a partial retreat from Southland, did not
involve an agreement to arbitrate statutory rights in a regulatory setting.
Rather, the limitation incorporated by reference was described as "pro-
cedural" and was an integral part of a modern state arbitration act
that fostered arbitration. Furthermore, the procedural rule dealt with
when rather than whether the agreed arbitration should proceed. Unlike
Southland, the incorporated rule did not void any agreement to arbitrate
specified statutory rights.
These distinctions leave open the ultimate question whether, in cases
like Southland, a general choice of law agreement that incorporates
substantive state prohibitions or limitations that are unique to arbitration
will be enforced under the FAA? Will the Court simply enforce the
general choice of law agreement or will it presume that unique and
substantive limitations are not incorporated unless specifically identified
in the agreement? This approach would be consistent with the conclusion
in Mitsubishi Motors that the parties must clearly exclude statutory
rights from a general agreement to arbitrate. Or would, as the dissenters
in Volt argued,241 such an agreement be so inconsistent with federal
policy under the FAA that it must be denied enforcement?
The answers, obviously, must await that inevitable "next" case. But
whatever the Court decides, the commitment to the preemptive effect
of Southland, as tempered by the content and quality of the parties'
agreement to arbitrate, appears to be firm.
2. Arbitration of Federal Statutory Rights. Assuming that the parties
have agreed to arbitrate federally created statutory rights, three plausible
directions for reform appear on the federal level.
First, Congress should be clearer about which federal statutory rights
are appropriate for arbitration and which are not. Without the exclu-
239. Id. at 1255.
240. Id.
241. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. Id. at 1256.
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sionary clarity required by McMahon (and without the benefit of the
presumption rejected in Mitsubishi Motors), agreements interpreted to
include federally created statutory rights will go to arbitration willy
nilly.
Second, Congress should enact legislation modeled on the New Jersey
Alternative Procedures for Dispute Resolution Act. 242 This legislation
gives disputants power to contract into an extra-judicial dispute resolution
system that varies from arbitration in several important ways: (1) the
decision maker, a private party called an Umpire, is given "full juris-
diction to provide all relief and to determine all claims and disputes
arising thereunder, including whether the particular dispute is covered
by the agreement for alternative resolution, and whether there was fraud
in the inducement of the entire contract"; 243 (2) each party is given a
broad statutory right to discovery 244 and, after a full hearing, the Umpire
shall determine any question and render a final award which "shall
state findings of all relevant material facts, and make all applicable
determinations of law. 2 45 Furthermore, the Umpire "shall make the
award on all issues submitted for alternative resolution in accordance
with applicable principles of substantive law"; 246 (3) finally, the courts
are given broader power to review a decision by the Umpire. Although
a "decision of the Umpire on the facts shall be final if there is substantial
evidence to support that decision," 247 the award "shall be vacated" by
the court if the rights of the applying party "were prejudiced by . . .
the Umpire's committing prejudicial error by erroneously applying law
to the issues and facts presented for alternative resolution. ' 248 Similarly,
the award may be vacated if the applying party was prejudiced by the
Umpire's "(f)ailure to follow the procedures set forth in this act, unless
the party applying to vacate the award continued with the proceeding
with notice of the defect and without objection.' '249
242. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:23A-1-23A-19 (West 1987). See Comment, supra note
31. A bill proposing a similar system was introduced in Congress in June 1987 for
consideration by the House Judiciary Committee. H.R. 2721, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987).
243. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-5(a) (West 1987). A claim that the alternative
resolution clause was procured by fraud, however, is decided by the court. The Umpire
also has broad power to consolidate separate agreements for dispute resolution or an
agreement for dispute resolution and a judicial proceeding. Id. at § 2A:23A-3. See
Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for Workable Solutions,
72 IowA L. REv. 473 (1987).
244. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-11(b) (West 1987).
245. Id. at § 2A:23A-12(a).
246. Id. at § 2A:23A-12(e).
247. Id. at § 2A:23A-13(b).
248. Id. at § 2A:23A-13(c)(5). The same test is applicable to a modification of an
award. Id. at § 2A:23A-13(f).
249. Id. at § 2A:23A-13(c)(4).
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The New Jersey statute responds directly to the concerns about the
limitations of conventional arbitration in resolving disputes over statutory
rights. As an alternative to both conventional arbitration and litigation
in courts, it would provide an attractive possibility if the parties agreed
to use it.
Third, federal courts should adopt and adapt the limitations upon
issue and claim preclusion announced in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co. to disputes over statutory rights. In the absence of an alternative
dispute resolution statute and in addition to the grounds to vacate in
FAA section 10, a court should not be precluded from reviewing the
merits of the arbitrator's final decision unless the other party can, at
the very least, demonstrate that the arbitral procedures were substantially
similar to those available in litigation and the arbitrator actually decided
the questions of fact and law presented. This approach does not depend
upon the intention of the parties. Rather, preclusion depends upon the
adequacy and quality of the procedures involved in the arbitration.
The question remains whether any limitation on preclusion is consistent
with the court's decision at the threshold that the dispute was arbitrable.
Enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate federal statutory rights assumes
that Congress did not clearly prohibit such an arbitration. The tentative
answer is yes if a private agreement to settle the dispute over statutory
rights would not be against public policy and there is a good chance
that the parties might acquiesce in the arbitrator's final award without
an appeal. To the extent that informed parties have power to settle a
dispute over statutory rights and are satisfied with the arbitrator's
decision, this variation on arbitration performs an important "weeding
out" function. This function should be preserved, even though a more
complete judicial review is available to either party.
3. Arbitration of State Statutory Rights. The interaction between
the FAA and state imposed limitations upon the arbitration of state
created statutory rights poses a more pressing problem. Under the
Southland decision, suspect state limitations upon the federal contract
right to arbitrate include the prohibition of arbitration in particular
settings, the requirement of a greater informational disclosure before
the agreement to arbitrate is enforceable and, presumably, the grant of
a greater power to review final awards than is available under the FAA.
Volt Information Sciences now provides a partial, affirmative answer
to the question whether the parties can contract out of the FAA and
into state law that imposes some limitations upon the federal contract
right to arbitrate. Regulated organizations with opportunities to use the
protective umbrella of the FAA that blunt the effect of statutory rights,
however, will be unwilling to contract into those limitations. Limitations
on Southland that are not dependent upon an agreement between the
parties must, therefore, be devised.
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The effect of Southland could be reduced without a direct attack
on its underpinnings. A federal court could apply the presumption
rejected in Mitsubishi Motors to the arbitration of state created statutory
rights or enforce agreements between the parties to apply state law
which contains limitations on the federal contract right to arbitrate.
More importantly, the courts should review and, perhaps, restrict the
broad interpretation of "contract evidencing a transaction in commerce"
in FAA section 2. The contention that Congress, in enacting the FAA,
intended to exploit its full power under the Commerce Clause is du-
bious. 250 Moreover, the clear need in 1925 to protect transactions in
commerce from the common law "ouster" doctrine has been obviated
by the enactment in almost every state of modem arbitration legislation
that enforces valid agreements to arbitrate future disputes. In short,
there is no need for an across the board interpretation of FAA section
2 to equal the full power of Congress to regulate commerce.
A more direct approach would be for Congress or the Court to
repudiate the Southland case, provided that two conditions were met:
(1) the state has a general arbitration statute that is at least as good
as the FAA; and (2) the state created limitations on the federal contract
right to arbitrate state created statutory rights are otherwise within the
state police powers and do not transgress the limitations imposed by
the "dormant" or "unimplemented" commerce clause.251' This approach,
if adopted by Congress, would neutralize any incentive of the regulated
party to misuse arbitration without disturbing existing and acceptable
accommodations between state and federal power.
A final solution involves preclusion. At the very least, any court
reviewing an arbitrator's final decision on state created statutory rights
should have the same power as if a federal statutory right were involved.
I have suggested that there should be no preclusive effect unless the
other party establishes that the procedures available in arbitration were
substantially similar to those available in court and that the arbitrator
actually decided the relevant issues of fact and law. But where Southland
applies and the state has limited the federal right to arbitrate, a better
approach is to deny any preclusive effect to the merits of the final
award. This result, although extreme, rests upon a sound policy con-
clusion: despite the FAA, a regulated organization should not be per-
mitted to use arbitration as a device to neutralize or avoid otherwise
250. Although a definitive study of the legislative history has yet to be done, a careful
review of the relevant documents reveals a high degree of uncertainty. See Note, A
Controversial Setting of a Settlement Controversy: The Supreme Court Declares the
Federal Arbitration Act Preemptive of State Laws and Applicable in State Courts, 36
ALA. L. REV. 273, 279-89 (1984).
251. See Redish & Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional
Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569.
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valid state regulatory legislation. This means that a state or federal
court should be empowered to determine on review whether the rights
of the protected party and the public have been vindicated in the arbitral
forum.
4. A Final Word. These suggested solutions apply in situations where
neither the parties in their agreement nor Congress have clearly stated
that the arbitration of statutory rights is not intended. They apply to
the set of problems generated by the franchise hypothetical. They rest
upon the assumption that conventional arbitration, over time, is not
likely to provide adequate protection to the parties and the public for
whose benefit the regulatory legislation was enacted.
The proposals, however, are not intended to constitute a "case against"
arbitration. Rather, they call for an assessment of the strengths and
weaknesses of conventional arbitration in regulatory settings and for
particularized responses in the interest of improved arbitral capacity. 252
Until these problems are confronted in a realistic manner, the institution
of arbitration must absorb the costs of the Supreme Court's zeal in
interpreting the FAA:23 (1) the creation of a unitary federal contract
right to arbitrate which ignores problems of arbitral capacity at the
threshold; (2) the displacement of state law which limits or prohibits
the arbitration of state created statutory rights; and (3) an invitation
to regulated organizations who control the process of contracting to use
arbitration as a device to blunt the force of regulatory legislation under
the protective umbrella of the FAA. As this article goes to press, the
Supreme Court's zeal was manifested once again: Wilko v. Swan has
been overruled. 4
252. Compare Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 828 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
where the court, speaking through Judge Ginsburg, stated that the rationale for the liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration is "at its strongest where the arbitration will be governed
by procedures specifically tailored to the context from which the agreement to arbitrate
arises, and will be conducted by arbitrators who are expert in the norms and practices
of the relevant industry .... "
253. See Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REv.
1, 22-23 (1985), who suggests that the unwillingness or inability of Congress to legislate
gives the "last word to the federal courts rather than to Congress." Further: "In practice
. . . institutionalization of lawmaking by federal courts would represent a major shift in
policymaking power away from Congress and toward the federal judiciary, in violation of
the constitutional scheme."
254. Ofelia Rodriquez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 57 U.S.L.W.
4539 (May 15, 1989).
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